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ABSTRACT 
On June 15, 2006, the Supreme Court announced in Hudson v. Mi-
chigan1 that the remedy of the exclusionary rule would not be avail-
able to suppress evidence found in searches after Fourth Amendment 
knock-and-announce violations. The decision represents the demise of 
the knock-and-announce rule and has broad significance for the fu-
ture of the exclusionary rule. Hudson creates a potentially broad new 
exception to the exclusionary rule (the parallel universe exception) 
which relies on what police officers hypothetically could have done in-
stead of what they actually did. It also creates a new class of Fourth 
Amendment violations (fruitless poisonous trees) which are automati-
cally ineligible for the exclusionary rule. This Article provides a criti-
cal analysis of the majority opinion, responding to each argument 
made and addressing major logical flaws and inconsistencies in the 
rationales and reasoning offered by Justice Scalia. The Article also 
places Hudson in the broader context of the Court's jurisprudence and 
addresses the implications of the decision for the exclusionary rule. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On June 15, 2006, the Supreme Court announced in Hudson v. 
Michigan that the remedy of the exclusionary rule would not be 
available to suppress evidence found in searches after Fourth 
Amendment knock-and-announce violations.2 The decision was 
widely seen in the press as the end of the protection afforded by the 
knock-and-announce rule.3 Although lamentable, the demise of the 
knock-and-announce requirement is just the beginning of the damage 
wrought by this significant and far-reaching opinion.  
 
 2. Id. The Supreme Court has referred to the knock-and-announce rule both with 
hyphens and without. I shall use the hyphenated version adopted by Justice Scalia in the 
majority opinion in Hudson v. Michigan. 
 3. See, e.g., David Ashenfelter & Cecil Ange, Cops Don’t Have to Knock, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS,  June 16, 2006; Joan Biskupic, Justices Allow No-Knock Searches: 5-4 Deci-
sion Backing Police Is Major Shift, USA TODAY, June 16, 2006, at 1A; Bob Egelko, Police 
Intrusion for Evidence Allowed: Knock, Announce Not Always Needed, High Court Rules, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 16, 2006, at A4; Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Protection 
Against Improper Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A-28; Charles Lane, Court Eases 
‘No Knock’ Search Ban: Illegally Collected Evidence Allowed, WASH. POST, June 16, 2006, 
at A1; David G. Savage, Justices Ease Limits on Police Entry, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at 
A1; Jerry Seper, Evidence Allowed in No-Knock Raid: Court Says Rule Not a Protection, 
WASH. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A6; Bill Mears, Police Don’t Have to Knock, Justices Say, 
CNN.com, June 15, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/06/15/scotus.search/index.html. 
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 Hudson is likely to have substantial impacts on law enforcement 
and the administration of criminal justice in the United States, as it 
creates both a potentially broad new exception to the exclusionary 
rule (which I call the parallel universe exception) and a new, second-
class category of Fourth Amendment violations (which I call fruitless 
poisonous trees). Although Justice Kennedy claimed in his concurring 
opinion that “the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as set-
tled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt,”4 this claim is un-
convincing. Indeed, both liberal and conservative scholars consider 
the case a major blow to the exclusionary rule. Dean David Moran, 
who represented the petitioner, believes Hudson “[k]ills the [k]nock-
and-[a]nnounce [r]ule and [p]uts the [e]xclusionary [r]ule on [l]ife 
[s]upport.”5 Professor Akhil Amar views Hudson in a positive light, 
but also considers it a momentous decision: “[T]he victors [in Hud-
son] have now secured a strong base for further action that could 
broadly reshape the lines of the exclusionary rule.”6  This Article pro-
vides a critical analysis of the methodology of the majority opinion, 
responding to each argument made and addressing major logical 
flaws and inconsistencies in the rationales and reasoning offered by 
Justice Scalia. The Article also places Hudson in the broader context 
of the Court’s jurisprudence and addresses the implications of the de-
cision for the exclusionary rule.  
II.   BACKGROUND TO HUDSON 
A.   Pre-Hudson Knock-and-Announce Cases 
 In 1995, in Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the 
“common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the rea-
sonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.”7 Justice Cla-
rence Thomas—writing for a unanimous Court—stated that “the rea-
sonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether 
law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority 
prior to entering”8 and “in some circumstances an officer’s unan-
nounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”9 Justice Thomas made it clear that a knock-and-
announce would not always be required: “This is not to say, of course, 
 
 4. Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2170. 
 5. David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The 
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 295. 
 6. Akhil Reed Amar, The Battle of Hudson Heights: A Small Case May Portend 
Big Changes for the Exclusionary Rule, SLATE, June 19, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2143983. 
 7. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 
 8. Id. at 931. 
 9. Id. at 934. 
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that every entry must be preceded by an announcement.”10 Later, in 
Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court elaborated on the circumstances 
under which the police could dispense with the knock-and-announce 
requirement.11 According to the Court, “[i]n order to justify a ‘no-
knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knock-
ing and announcing their presence, under the particular circum-
stances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the ef-
fective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the de-
struction of evidence.”12 The Court refined the Richards exigency ex-
ception in United States v. Ramirez, holding that “the lawfulness of a 
no-knock entry” does not depend “on whether property is damaged in 
the course of the entry.”13 Finally, in United States v. Banks,14 the 
Court further elaborated on the knock-and-announce rule, holding 
that in a routine case the police must not only knock and announce 
before entering, but that the police must allow a “reasonable wait 
time”15 to ensure that “an occupant has had time to get to the door”16 
before forcing entry. The Court did not provide a specific test to de-
termine what would be a reasonable period of time, but rather indi-
cated that reasonableness would be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis considering “ ‘the totality of the circumstances.’ ”17  
 Thus, after Banks, it is clear there are two distinct requirements 
of the knock-and-announce rule and therefore two potential Fourth 
Amendment violations if the police fail to follow the Court’s admoni-
tion to both announce their presence and allow a reasonable time for 
the occupants to answer the door. What none of these four cases 
(Wilson, Richards, Ramirez, and Banks) specifically addressed is 
what the remedy for a knock-and-announce violation should be. Of 
course, the normal consequence for a Fourth Amendment violation is 
the suppression of all “fruits” of the violation under the exclusionary 
rule,18 but none of the knock-and-announce cases explicitly stated 
that if the trial judge found a Fourth Amendment violation he or she 
would then be obligated to exclude the fruits of the subsequent 
search of the residence. In Wilson v. Arkansas, Justice Thomas indi-
cated the issue was not properly before the Court: 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
 12. Id. at 394. For an insightful perspective on Wilson v. Arkansas and Richards v. 
Wisconsin, see Adina Schwartz, Homes as Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions on “Knock and Announce,” 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545 (1998). Professor Schwartz ar-
gues that these two cases were hollow rhetorical victories for defendants which provided 
little meaningful protection of traditional Fourth Amendment values. Id. at 567. 
 13. 523 U.S. 65, 70 (1998). 
 14. 540 U.S. 31 (2003). 
 15. Id. at 41. 
 16. Id. at 39-40.  
 17. Id. at 42 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). 
 18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). 
2007]                         FRUITLESS POISONOUS TREES 663 
 
                                                                                                                   
Respondent and its amici also ask us to affirm the denial of peti-
tioner’s suppression motion on an alternative ground: that exclu-
sion is not a constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreason-
ableness of a search stems from the failure of announcement. . . . 
[R]espondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an 
unreasonable, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from 
the constitutional violation and that exclusion goes beyond the 
goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the 
constitutional violation. Because this remedial issue was not ad-
dressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on 
which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these arguments.19
 In Ramirez, Chief Justice Rehnquist hinted that the issue of 
whether exclusion should flow from a knock-and-announce violation 
was potentially an open question.20  However, criminal defense coun-
sel around the country assumed that a knock-and-announce violation 
would require suppression, and they filed numerous motions to sup-
press on that basis. “The cases reporting knock-and-announce viola-
tions are legion.”21 Likewise, the vast majority of state and federal 
courts which considered the issue assumed that suppression was re-
quired if they found the police conduct unreasonable.22 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court, in two pre-Wilson opinions, found that a knock-and-
announce violation of federal search and seizure statutes23 required 
exclusion of the evidence found inside the home following the viola-
tion.24 In one Sixth Circuit case, when the U.S. Attorney argued that 
a violation of knock-and-announce did not require exclusion of the 
evidence, the Court of Appeals barely acknowledged the argument. 
“The government’s argument here is no more than an attempt to cir-
cumvent this clear and binding precedent that knock-and-announce 
violations require suppression . . . . We do not find this effort convinc-
ing.”25 The two exceptions to the prevailing wisdom were the Michi-
gan Supreme Court26 and the Seventh Circuit.27 In 2005, in Hudson 
 
 19. 514 U.S. 927, 937 n.4 (1995).  
 20. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998) (indicating that application 
of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a “sufficient causal relationship be-
tween” the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence). 
 21. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2174 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
Annual Review, Investigation and Police Practice: The Warrant Requirement, 34 GEO. L.J. 
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 19, 31-35 (2005) (collecting courts of appeals cases); William D. 
Bremer, Annotation, What Constitutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search 
of Private Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (2001) (collecting state court cases)). 
 22. See infra notes 63 and 64. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3101-18 (2000); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 24. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 
301 (1958). The D.C. Circuit recently held that these two precedents were overruled by 
Hudson and do not offer an independent basis for exclusion. United States v. Southerland, 
466 F.3d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 25. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 26. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). 
664  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:659 
 
                                                                                                                   
v. Michigan,  the Court decided the issue was ripe for resolution.28 
The opinion, issued June 15, 2006, held that the exclusionary rule 
would not apply to knock-and-announce violations.29 This ruling is 
both controversial and complex and has implications far beyond the 
relatively narrow issue decided.  
B.   Facts of Hudson v. Michigan 
 The facts of Hudson, as set forth in the Court’s opinion, are 
straightforward and unremarkable: 
 Police obtained a warrant authorizing a search for drugs and 
firearms at the home of petitioner Booker Hudson. They discovered 
both. Large quantities of drugs were found, including cocaine rocks 
in Hudson’s pocket. A loaded gun was lodged between the cushion 
and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was 
charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm pos-
session.  
   . . . When the police arrived to execute the warrant, they an-
nounced their presence, but waited only a short time—perhaps 
“three to five seconds” . . . .30
 Although the state had a good argument under Richards v. Wis-
consin that the officers acted reasonably in this case (since they 
might have feared that Hudson would destroy the drugs or pose a 
threat to them because of the gun) and, perhaps, could have dis-
pensed with knock-and-announce entirely,31 Michigan nevertheless 
“conceded that the entry was a knock-and-announce violation” be-
cause the police did not wait a reasonable amount of time after an-
 
 27. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1075 (2003); see also United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. de-
nied, 534 U.S. 1105 (2002). 
 28. 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005) (grant of writ of certiorari). Interestingly, the Court passed 
on at least four opportunities to address the issue before granting certiorari in Hudson. See 
Langford, 314 F.3d 892, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1075; Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, cert denied, 
534 U.S. 1105; Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W.2d 648, 657-58 (Ark. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 927 (1999); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164. Ironically, when it did 
ultimately grant certiorari, it was effectively reviewing the exact case it had declined to re-
view in 1999, for People v. Hudson is nothing more than an application of People v. Stevens. 
People v. Michigan, 639 N.W.2d 255 (2001); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53. 
 29. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).  
 30. Id. at 2162. Justice Scalia’s characterization of “large quantities of drugs” is ques-
tionable. See id. In fact, twenty rocks of cocaine were found in the search, among seven 
people who were present in the home. Moran, supra note 5, at 297. The trial judge attrib-
uted five rocks of cocaine to Hudson and sentenced him to probation. Id. at 297-98.  
 31. 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
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nouncing themselves before forcing entry.32 The violation having 
been conceded, the only issue for the court to decide was the remedy.33  
C.   Procedural History of Hudson v. Michigan 
 The procedural history of Hudson is noteworthy because the com-
position of the Court changed while the case was under considera-
tion. The writ of certiorari was granted on June 27, 2005.34 The origi-
nal oral argument was held on January 9, 2006.35 Before a decision 
in the case could be reached, Justice O’Connor retired on January 31, 
2006; she was replaced the same day by Justice Alito. With Justice 
O’Connor’s departure, the Court was apparently deadlocked 4-4, so 
the Court granted re-argument on April 19, 2006.36 The case was re-
argued on May 18, 2006.37 The case was decided on June 15, 2006, in 
favor of the State of Michigan by a 5-4 margin.38  
D.   Brief Summary of Holding 
 The issue in Hudson, as framed by Justice Scalia, was “whether 
violation of the ‘knock-and announce’ rule require[d] the suppression 
of all evidence found in the search.”39 A five-member majority con-
cluded that evidence found in a search after a knock-and-announce 
violation would not be considered “fruit” of the violation and there-
fore need not be suppressed. The Court cited two major reasons. 
First, the “social costs” of applying the exclusionary rule would out-
weigh its deterrence value, especially since there were civil remedies 
available which would have a deterrent effect: “[T]he social costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are 
considerable; the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin 
with, and the extant deterrences against them are substantial . . . .”40 
 
 32. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. 
 33. Id. The apparent reason the prosecutor conceded the violation at the trial court 
level was that under People v. Stevens, there was no remedy for a knock-and-announce vio-
lation in Michigan, so there was no harm in conceding one. 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999). 
 34. Hudson v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005). 
 35. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2159. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. According to counsel for petitioner Hudson, David Moran (Associate Dean at 
Wayne State University College of Law), who agreed to be quoted for this Article, Justice 
O’Connor appeared to be favorably disposed toward his client’s position in the original oral 
argument, and he felt certain that she would have voted to enforce the exclusionary rule. 
Based on her prior opinions in exclusionary rule cases, including her dissent in Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (discussed in Section XXI), this conclusion seems war-
ranted. Thus, the retirement of Justice O’Connor and her replacement by Justice Alito very 
likely changed the outcome of the case. This view was echoed in several press accounts. See 
supra note 4. Dean Moran provides further support for this position in his article. Moran, 
supra note 5.  
 39. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162. 
 40. Id. at 2168. 
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Second, the evidence was discovered during a search with a valid 
warrant.41 According to the majority, the knock-and-announce viola-
tion simply accelerated the finding of the evidence by a few seconds; 
thus, there was only a limited causal connection between the viola-
tion of the rule and the seizure of the evidence.42 Accordingly, 
“[r]esort[ing] to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt 
is unjustified.”43  
 The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.44 Justice Ken-
nedy concurred in a separate opinion.45 Justice Breyer wrote an im-
passioned and lengthy dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Stevens.46
III.   A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION IN HUDSON V. 
MICHIGAN 
 The Court’s opinion is deeply flawed, both philosophically and 
logically; it is not only riddled with inconsistencies and invalid con-
clusions, but is at times intellectually dishonest. According to Profes-
sor LaFave, “Hudson deserves a special niche in the Supreme Court’s 
pantheon of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as one would be 
hard-pressed to find another case with so many bogus arguments 
piled atop one another.”47 In short, the Court is “dead wrong.”48 Some 
of these “bogus arguments” and other weaknesses are explored by 
the dissent of Justice Breyer;49 this Article expands on some of Jus-
tice Breyer’s arguments and focuses on additional points not raised 
by the dissent.  
A.   The Causation Argument 
 The majority’s most superficially persuasive argument in support 
of the position that the exclusionary rule should not apply is its cau-
sation argument—that is, the knock-and-announce violation did not 
cause the incriminating evidence to be found and therefore suppres-
sion is unwarranted.50 But the causation argument depends on the 
 
 41. Id. at 2162. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 2168. 
 44. Id. at 2161. 
 45. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 2171 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 47. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 4TH AMENDMENT § 
11.4, at 15-16 Supp. (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007). 
 48. Id. at 15 Supp.  
 49. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 2164 (majority opinion). 
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majority’s characterization of the constitutional violation and their 
definition of causation, both of which are flawed.51  
 The majority and the minority characterize the constitutional vio-
lation quite differently. The majority’s characterization of the uncon-
stitutional police conduct in Hudson could be summed up as “after an 
unlawful entry, but during a lawful search, the police found incrimi-
nating evidence.” Put in these terms, it would seem unfair to penal-
ize the police (or society) by excluding valid evidence that the police 
discovered during the search. Viewed from a different perspective, 
exclusion seems much more logical. The minority’s characterization 
of the constitutional violation could be summed up as “during an un-
reasonably executed search, the police found incriminating evidence.”  
Stated this way, suppression would seem to be inevitable. The minor-
ity’s view is more consistent with the Court’s prior view of the entry 
as an integral component of the search.52 As Justice Breyer states,  
[S]eparating the “manner of entry” from the related search slices 
the violation too finely. As noted . . . we have described a failure to 
comply with the knock-and-announce rule, not as an independ-
ently unlawful event, but as a factor that renders the search “con-
stitutionally defective.”53 . . . “([A] lawful entry is the indispensable 
predicate of a reasonable search.)”54
According to Justice Breyer, “[t]he officers’ failure to knock and an-
nounce rendered the entire search unlawful, . . . and that unlawful 
search led to the discovery of evidence in petitioner’s home.”55 Put 
another way, if compliance with knock-and-announce is part of the 
inquiry into the reasonableness of the search and reasonableness of 
the search determines whether the exclusionary rule will be applied, 
then a knock-and-announce violation must trigger the exclusionary 
rule.56 The majority did not see it this way. 
 The majority and minority also differed in their definition of the 
term “causation.” According to Justice Scalia, “the constitutional vio-
lation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtain-
ing the evidence. Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or 
not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, 
and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.”57 
Justice Kennedy, in a separate concurring opinion, endorsed this 
view of causation: “In this case the relevant evidence was discovered 
 
 51. See id. The argument also assumes that the exclusionary rule has a rigid causa-
tion requirement, a proposition that is challenged later in this Article. See infra Part V.I.  
 52. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)). 
 54. Id. (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 55. Id. at 2184.  
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. at 2164 (majority opinion). 
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not because of a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a sub-
sequent search pursuant to a lawful warrant.”58 Justice Kennedy fur-
ther explained, “When . . . a violation results from want of a 20-
second pause but an ensuing, lawful search lasting five hours dis-
closes evidence of criminality, the failure to wait at the door cannot 
properly be described as having caused the discovery of evidence.”59 
Justice Breyer, writing for the minority, took a decidedly different 
view of causation: 
 The majority first argues that “the constitutional violation of an 
illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the 
evidence.” . . . But taking causation as it is commonly understood 
in the law, I do not see how that can be so. . . . Although the police 
might have entered Hudson’s home lawfully, they did not in fact do 
so. Their unlawful behavior inseparably characterizes their actual 
entry; that entry was a necessary condition of their presence in 
Hudson’s home; and their presence in Hudson’s home was a neces-
sary condition of their finding and seizing the evidence. At the 
same time, their discovery of evidence in Hudson’s home was a 
readily foreseeable consequence of their entry and their unlawful 
presence within the home.60
 Perhaps the minority would have been better served citing a defi-
nition of but-for causation in the criminal law context. Using Profes-
sor Dressler’s definition of “actual” or “factual” causation, but-for 
causation can be summed up as follows: but for the voluntary act(s) 
of the person in question, the event would not have occurred “when it 
did.”61 A person who advances the time of an inevitable occurrence 
even by a few seconds is still said to have caused the event. For ex-
ample, one who hastens the death of one who has been fatally 
wounded (for example, by shooting or stabbing them), is still consid-
ered to be a “but for” cause of death and is still guilty of murder.62 Al-
though the victim would have died, the victim would not have died 
when he or she did. Using this definition, although the knock-and-
announce violation may have gained the police only a few seconds’ 
advantage, it can be said unequivocally that but for the knock-and-
announce violation, they would not have discovered the incriminat-
ing evidence when they did. The three emphasized words are critical, 
for without them, the majority can fairly say the knock-and-
announce violation was not a but-for cause; had the police not vio-
lated the knock-and-announce rule, they still would have found the 
 
 58. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 61. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 14.02, at 196 (4th ed. 2006). 
 62. Id. at 198-99. See State v. McDonald, 90 Wn. App. 604, 614  (1998) (collecting 
“hastening of death” cases); see also Henderson v. State, 65 So. 721 (Ala. Ct. App. 1914); 
People v. Cox, 123 Colo. 179  (1951); State v. Weston, 155 Ore. 556 (1937). 
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evidence, just not at the exact moment. Without the “when they did” 
element of the causation definition, knock-and-announce violations 
have the air of inevitable discovery about them. Professor Dressler’s 
definition of causation directly refutes Justice Kennedy’s view. Might 
a better-framed causation argument on the part of the dissenters 
have been enough to sway Justice Kennedy to their side? It is an 
intriguing possibility. 
B.   The “Protected Interests” Argument 
 A new rationale offered by Justice Scalia for declining to apply the 
exclusionary rule is what might be called the “protected interests” 
theory. Under this rule, each requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
is designed to protect specific discrete interests. Only if the exclu-
sionary rule “vindicates the entitlement” would it be appropriate to 
apply it. According to Justice Scalia, the knock-and-announce re-
quirement is designed to protect “human life and limb,” “property,” 
and “privacy and dignity”—not the shielding of potential evidence 
from the government’s eyes, in contrast to the warrant require-
ment.63  “[T]he knock-and-announce rule has never protected . . . 
one’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking 
evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were vio-
lated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, 
the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”64 In support of this theory, Justice 
Scalia cited two cases, United States v. Ceccolini65 and New York v. Har-
ris.66 Neither case provides convincing support for this argument.  
 Ceccolini was a straightforward application of the attenuation 
doctrine.67 The case involved a warrantless search.68 Evidence discov-
 
 63. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
 66. 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
 67. 435 U.S. at 268. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). In Ceccolini, a police officer lawfully entered a 
flower shop, the owner of which, Ceccolini, was suspected to be involved in illicit gambling 
operations. 435 U.S. at 269, 271. The police officer noticed an envelope with some money in 
it by the cash register and sneaked a look inside. Id. at 270. He noticed some “policy 
slips”—evidence of illegal gambling. Id. The officer asked a shop employee to whom the en-
velope belonged, and she indicated it belonged to Ceccolini. Id. The police officer reported 
this tidbit of information to the FBI. Id. Four months later, the FBI approached the flower 
shop employee and asked if she knew anything about Ceccolini’s involvement in gambling. 
Id. at 272. She volunteered to help and provided information about Ceccolini’s illicit gam-
bling activities. Id. Ceccolini was later summoned before a grand jury and testified that he 
was not involved in illegal gambling activities. Id. The employee testified at the grand jury 
to the contrary. Id. Ceccolini was charged with perjury. Id.  At his criminal trial, he moved 
to suppress the evidence of the envelope and its contents as well as the testimony of the 
employee. Id. The trial judge excluded the envelope and its contents but permitted the 
witness to testify and found Ceccolini guilty of perjury. Id. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed, finding that the employee’s testimony was fruit of the poisonous 
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ered during the search was excluded, but a witness that was discov-
ered as a result of the unlawful search was allowed to testify.69 Al-
though the Court did speak of protected interests, it did so in the 
context of the interests the exclusionary rule was designed to protect, 
rather than the interests the warrant requirement was designed to 
protect.70 “[C]onsiderations relating to the exclusionary rule and the 
constitutional principles which it is designed to protect must play a 
factor in the attenuation analysis . . . .”71 The point of Ceccolini was 
that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter constitutional viola-
tions. Thus, it was reasonable to consider whether exclusion of evi-
dence in a given case would deter constitutional violations.72 The 
Court made it clear that it was proper to apply the exclusionary rule 
to deter constitutional violations, but found that the deterrence value 
of applying the exclusionary rule to the testimony of this specific 
witness was “speculative and very likely negligible.”73   
 New York v. Harris does appear, at first glance, to provide limited 
support for the protected interests theory.74 In Harris, the Court de-
clined to suppress statements made by an arrested suspect in the 
station house after full rights advisement when the police had prob-
able cause for the arrest, but had arrested the suspect in his home 
without an arrest warrant as required by Payton v. New York.75 The 
Court agreed that statements made to the police in Harris’ home 
were properly suppressed, but declined  
to apply the exclusionary rule [to the other statement] because the 
rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of the 
home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects, like Har-
ris, protection for statements made outside their premises 
where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for 
committing a crime.76
 
tree, as her knowledge about Ceccolini’s gambling activities was discovered as a result of 
the police officer’s unlawful search. Id. at 273. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. Applying 
the attenuation doctrine, the Court held that the taint of the police officer’s unlawful 
search had been dissipated by the passage of time and by the “free will” of the voluntarily 
cooperating witness. Id. at 279. 
 68. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 272.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 279. 
 71. Id. Although Justice Scalia purports to apply a form of attenuation analysis in 
Hudson, the case clearly does not fit the mold of prior attenuation cases; as Justice Breyer 
notes in dissent, “the majority gives the word ‘attenuation’ a new meaning.” Hudson v. 
Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2180 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 72. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).  
 75. Id. at 16-17; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
 76. Harris, 495 U.S. at 17. 
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 Although couched in “protected interests” language, the opinion 
makes clear that Harris’ rights were not violated at all by taking the 
statement in the station house because the arrest essentially became 
legal once the suspect was removed from his home.77 According to the 
Court, the evidence sought to be excluded was not even “in some 
sense the product of illegal government activity.”78 The Harris Court 
made it clear that evidence obtained in a home after an unlawful in-
vasion of the home should be suppressed.79 Ironically, Justice Scalia 
cites Harris to bolster his argument that evidence obtained in the 
home after an unlawful invasion of the home should be admitted.80  
 The Court’s prior precedents offer such scant support for the pro-
tected interests theory that Professor LaFave concluded that this “to-
tally new interest-based attenuation doctrine” was “created out of 
whole cloth.”81 Although the doctrine may well have been created out 
of whole cloth, it does not seem to have been created by Justice 
Scalia. Although not cited by him, the “protected interests” rationale 
was first used as a basis for declining to apply the exclusionary rule 
to a knock-and-announce violation several years earlier in United 
States v. Espinoza.82 In a section of the opinion headed, “The Exclu-
sion of Evidence Is a Disproportionately Severe Sanction in Cases 
Where the Police Conduct Does Not Actually Harm Protected Inter-
ests,” Judge Coffey wrote: 
[W]here the violation of the Fourth Amendment in a particular 
case causes no discernable harm to the interests of an individual 
protected by the particular constitutional prohibition at issue (in 
the present case the knock and announce requirement), the exclu-
sion of evidence for the trial is a disproportionately severe and in-
appropriate sanction.83
According to Judge Coffey, “[t]he core interest protected by the knock 
and announce requirement is . . . the receipt of notice by occupants of 
the dwelling sufficient to avoid the degree of intrusiveness attendant 
to a forcible entry as well as any potential property damage that may 
result.”84 Judge Coffey concluded, “The [o]fficers’ [c]onduct [d]id 
[n]ot [h]arm Espinoza’s [i]nterests [p]rotected by the [k]nock and 
[a]nnounce [r]ule.”85
 
 77. Id. at 18. 
 78. Id. at 19.   
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2169 (2006). 
 81. LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 16 Supp.  
 82. 256 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 83. Id. at 725 (citation omitted).  
 84. Id. at 727.  
 85. Id. at 726.  
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 Judge Coffey’s approach was criticized in a vigorous dissent by 
Judge Wood86 and by the Harvard Law Review.87  Professor LaFave 
called the opinion “troublesome” and “wrong.”88 But the protected in-
terests theory was not Judge Coffey’s brainchild. Judge Coffey was 
relying on an opinion by Judge Posner, who appears to have origi-
nated the theory. In United States v. Stefonek, the police searched 
Stefonek’s home using a defective warrant.89 The warrant failed to 
state with particularity the items to be seized, stating only that “evi-
dence of crime” should be seized.90 Although the application for the 
warrant stated with specificity what the police wished to seize, the 
application was not incorporated by reference into the warrant.91 
Thus, the warrant was plainly defective on its face.92 According to 
Judge Posner, “[s]o open-ended is the description that the warrant 
can only be described as a general warrant.”93 Not even the good-
faith exception could salvage such a plainly defective search.94 As 
Judge Posner acknowledged, it would be “difficult” for the officers to 
“squeeze themselves into the exception to the exclusionary rule that 
the Supreme Court created in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), for unconstitutional searches conducted in good-faith reliance 
on a warrant. . . . because the defect in the warrant was patent . . . .”95
 Nevertheless, Judge Posner found a way to circumvent the exclu-
sionary rule and allow the evidence in. One rationale advanced by 
Judge Posner was the protected interests theory.96 According to 
Judge Posner, “there must be a causal relation between the violation 
of the Fourth Amendment and the invasion of the defendant’s inter-
ests for him to be entitled to the remedy of exclusion.”97 Judge Posner 
cited no authority for this extraordinary proposition. According to 
Judge Posner, Stefonek’s interest protected by the particularity re-
quirement was the right not to be subjected to a search that would 
exceed the scope that a magistrate could have lawfully authorized.98 
Judge Posner concluded that this interest was not violated because 
“[t]he search would . . . have been identical in scope, and exactly the 
same evidence would have been seized, had the warrant complied 
 
 86. Id. at 729 (Wood, J., dissenting).  
 87. Recent Cases, United States v. Espinoza, 115 HARV. L. REV. 709 (2001).  
 88. LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 274. 
 89. 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 90. Id. at 1032.  
 91. Id. at 1032-33. 
 92. Id. at 1034. 
 93. Id. at 1033. 
 94. Id. at 1033-34. 
 95. Id. (citations omitted). 
 96. Id. at 1035. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1033. 
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with the Constitution, which is to say, had the warrant repeated the 
application’s description of the things to be seized.”99 
 The problem with the protected interests theory is that the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule depends entirely on the way that the 
judge chooses to characterize the interests. It invites judges to cir-
cumvent application of the exclusionary rule by creative and narrow 
characterization of the interests protected by each requirement pre-
viously imposed by the Court. A broad interpretation of Fourth 
Amendment interests, such as “the interest in being free from unrea-
sonable police activity,” leads to exclusion, while a narrow interpre-
tation does not. This creates a powerful incentive to narrowly inter-
pret the Fourth Amendment. 
 For example, consider the warrant requirement. Justice Scalia 
characterized the right protected by the warrant requirement as an 
“entitlement” of citizens “to shield ‘their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,’ from the government’s scrutiny.”100 Thus, according to Jus-
tice Scalia’s logic, the fruits of a warrantless search would generally 
be subject to exclusion. However, under Judge Posner’s analysis, the 
warrant requirement could be characterized as protecting the inter-
est in being subjected only to a search that a magistrate could (or 
would) have authorized. Under this interpretation, so long as the po-
lice could have applied for a warrant (that is, had probable cause) 
and the search was limited in scope to what a magistrate would have 
lawfully authorized if presented with a proper warrant application, 
then applying the exclusionary rule would not be necessary. This is 
exactly the scenario proposed by Professor Akhil Amar as the next 
logical step in dismantling the exclusionary rule.101 According to Pro-
fessor Amar, “[w]ith Hudson on the books, state and federal prosecu-
tors should now try to find the Next Perfect Test Case.”102 Professor 
Amar’s ideal of the “Next Perfect Test Case” is one where the police 
had probable cause to search but failed to obtain a warrant under a 
good-faith mistaken belief that they did not need one because they 
believed that an exception to the warrant requirement (such as con-
sent or exigent circumstances) existed.103 However novel and unsup-
ported it may be, the protected interests theory is a potentially pow-
erful weapon in the arsenal of those seeking to limit or destroy the 
exclusionary rule.  
 
 99. Id. at 1034. 
 100. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 101. Amar, supra note 6. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
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C.   The Costs of the Exclusionary Rule 
 The majority’s primary justification for declining to apply the ex-
clusionary rule is not lack of causation, but the “costs” of its applica-
tion.104 According to Justice Scalia, 
[t]he costs here are considerable. In addition to the grave adverse 
consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence al-
ways entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into 
society), imposing that massive remedy for a knock-and-announce 
violation would generate a constant flood of alleged failures to ob-
serve the rule, and claims that any asserted Richards justification 
for a no-knock entry had inadequate support. The cost of entering 
this lottery would be small, but the jackpot enormous: suppression 
of all evidence, amounting in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free 
card. Courts would experience as never before the reality that 
“[t]he exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation to 
determine whether particular evidence must be excluded.”105
 Thus, according to Justice Scalia, there are actually multiple 
types of costs involved. The first is the classic argument against the 
exclusionary rule—“the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into so-
ciety” or, as famously put by Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, “the 
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”106 This 
argument was rebutted by Justice Brennan in dissent in the case of 
U.S. v. Leon:107  
[T]he Court has frequently bewailed the “cost” of excluding reliable 
evidence. In large part, this criticism rests upon a refusal to ac-
knowledge the function of the Fourth Amendment itself. If nothing 
else, the Amendment plainly operates to disable the government 
from gathering information and securing evidence in certain ways. 
In practical terms, of course, this restriction of official power 
means that some incriminating evidence inevitably will go unde-
tected if the government obeys these constitutional restraints. It is 
the loss of that evidence that is the “price” our society pays for en-
joying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth 
Amendment. Thus, some criminals will go free not, in Justice (then 
Judge) Cardozo’s misleading epigram, “because the constable has 
blundered,” but rather because official compliance with Fourth 
Amendment requirements makes it more difficult to catch crimi-
nals. Understood in this way, the Amendment directly contem-
plates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be lost to 
the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the 
Amendment itself that has imposed the cost.108   
 
 104. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66. 
 105. Id. (citations omitted). 
 106. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1926). 
 107. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 108. Id. at  941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 587).  
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 This argument did not sway Justice Scalia, who speaks only of the 
costs of the exclusionary rule. Even if we assume that there are 
“costs” associated with the exclusionary rule, what about the coun-
tervailing costs? As Justice Stevens has stated, “the more relevant 
cost is that imposed on society by police officers who decide to take 
procedural shortcuts instead of complying with the law.”109 Justice 
Stevens was referring to the costs of litigation and delays to justice 
occasioned by police misconduct.110 The majority has simply removed 
this cost from the balance sheet by eliminating the availability of the 
exclusionary remedy.111 Without the availability of the exclusionary 
remedy, there will be no litigation,112 no delay, and no costs to soci-
ety. 
 Justice Scalia also gives short shrift to the most important coun-
tervailing cost—the costs to society and to individuals when the po-
lice fail to follow the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. In discuss-
ing “the interests protected by the knock-and-announce require-
ment,” Justice Scalia notes three: first, “the protection of human life 
and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in 
supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.”113 He is presumably 
concerned about the police officers who may be shot, as well as the 
resident who may mistakenly shoot at the police, then be shot him-
self in response.114 The second interest is “the protection of property,” 
since requiring the police to knock-and-announce and wait a few 
moments gives the residents a chance to open the door before the po-
lice break it down.115  
And thirdly, the knock-and-announce rule protects those elements 
of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance. 
It gives residents the “opportunity to prepare themselves for” the 
entry of the police. “The brief interlude between announcement 
and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individ-
ual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.”116
 Justice Scalia minimized the significance of the privacy interests 
protected by knock-and-announce by characterizing the requirement 
of delayed entry merely as an “opportunity to collect oneself before 
answering the door.”117 There is no mention of the right to be secure 
in one’s own home, the fear and anxiety and shock created when the 
 
 109. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 457 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 110. Id. at 457-58. 
 111. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006). 
 112. As suppression will be unavailable, there will be no point in defense counsel filing 
suppression motions. This argument is further developed in Part VI.C, infra. 
 113. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.  
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)). 
 117. See id.  
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police suddenly invade an individual’s or family’s personal domain 
without warning, or the larger cost to society of living in a country 
where the police need not knock and announce their presence before 
entering homes to search. Professor Gerald Uelman mentions an-
other important omission by Justice Scalia: “I found it somewhat re-
markable that the U.S. Supreme Court made no reference at all to 
one of the most important interests served by the knock-and-
announce requirement: the protection of victims of ‘wrong door’ raids 
by law enforcement officers.”118 Greater consideration of these costs 
might have tipped the balance in favor of giving the knock-and-
announce rule the teeth of the exclusionary rule. 
D.   Costs to Judicial Economy: The Potential for a Flood of Litigation 
 The other cost that Justice Scalia cites is a burden to judicial 
economy.119 He speculates that imposing the remedy of exclusion for 
a violation of the knock-and-announce rule would “generate a con-
stant flood”120 of litigation. “Courts would experience as never before the 
reality that ‘[t]he exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litiga-
tion to determine whether particular evidence must be excluded.’ ”121
 Aside from the obvious point that courts exist for the purpose of 
resolving issues of constitutional rights, there is another reason that 
this argument is disingenuous. When Justice Scalia states that al-
lowing an exclusionary remedy would suddenly open the floodgates 
“as never before,”122 he fails to mention that the floodgates already 
were open and there was no flood. If there were going to be a sub-
stantial amount of frivolous litigation, then this problem would al-
ready have manifested itself, since the vast majority of courts have 
been open to suppression motions based on knock-and-announce vio-
lations for several years.  
 Although the Supreme Court had not explicitly stated that a 
knock-and-announce violation would automatically lead to exclusion 
of evidence, the assumption of most lower courts has been that it 
would. The Supreme Court itself had on two occasions prior to Wilson 
v. Arkansas123 found that a knock-and-announce violation required 
exclusion of the evidence found inside the home following the viola-
tion.124 When the U.S. Attorney argued before the Sixth Circuit that 
 
 118. Gerald F. Uelman, Knock and Announce Violations After Hudson v. Michigan, 
THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2006, at 62, 
 119. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66.  
 120. Id. at 2166.  
 121. Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 366 (1998)). 
 122. Id.  
 123. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 124. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 
301 (1958). 
2007]                         FRUITLESS POISONOUS TREES 677 
 
                                                                                                                   
a violation of knock-and-announce did not require exclusion of the 
evidence, the Court did not even consider it a close issue: “The gov-
ernment’s argument here is no more than an attempt to circumvent 
this clear and binding precedent that knock-and-announce violations 
require suppression . . . . We do not find this effort convincing.”125 
Conspicuously absent in Justice Scalia’s opinion is any mention of 
the fact that the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the is-
sue, both state and federal, had determined that violations of knock-
and-announce did require the suppression of evidence, although the 
petitioner’s brief had made this plain.126  
 In addition to the circuits noted by petitioner (Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Tenth),127 the First and Ninth Circuits also applied the 
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations or indicated that 
they would in the appropriate case.128 Justice Breyer noted that there 
had been many reported cases.129 It is instructive that Justice Scalia 
did not note any of these prior decisions or even that there was a cir-
cuit split on the issue. It would have been more difficult for the Jus-
tice to flatly state his conclusion that the courts would be inun-
dated if he had to acknowledge that a knock-and-announce exclu-
sionary rule in so many courts had not resulted in an unmanage-
able flood of litigation.  
 Justice Scalia does not actually say that criminal defendants 
would make frivolous suppression motions, but this must be what he 
means because no Justice would announce an intent to discourage 
legitimate claims of constitutional violations. The clear implication 
by Justice Scalia is that criminal defendants would readily bend the 
truth about the nature of the police entry into their home, falsely 
claiming that they failed to knock-and-announce or falsely claiming 
that they did not wait a reasonable time before entering. When the 
 
 125. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2000).  
 126. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (No. 04-
1360), 2005 WL 2072141 (According to Petitioner’s brief, “[a]t least ten federal and state 
appellate courts have rejected the position of the Michigan Supreme Court by squarely 
holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not exempt knock and announce viola-
tions from the exclusionary rule [ten listed cases omitted]. Only one appellate court, the 
Seventh Circuit, has endorsed the Michigan Supreme Court’s position. United States v. 
Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-895 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1075 (2003). Courts 
in many other jurisdictions have assumed that evidence seized inside a home after a knock 
and announce violation is the fruit of the violation and have therefore suppressed such 
evidence [fourteen listed cases omitted]. The clear majority of state and federal courts thus 
continue to suppress evidence seized from homes immediately after knock and announce 
violations . . . .”). 
 127. United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dice, 
200 F.3d 978, 984-86 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Gallegos, 314 F.3d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 128. United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 
540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003). See United States v. Boulanger, 444 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 129. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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police admitted to dispensing with knock-and-announce, Justice 
Scalia implies that defendants would frivolously challenge the gov-
ernment’s proffered justifications for doing so. Justice Scalia offers no 
evidence to support these conclusions, nor does he explain why the 
danger of superfluous suppression motions is greater in the knock-
and-announce context than any other. Justice Scalia also seems to be 
assuming that criminal suspects have a sophisticated knowledge of 
Fourth Amendment rights; this may not be warranted. Criminal de-
fendants would only know to make up a phony story about a knock-
and-announce violation if they knew the knock-and-announce rules. 
But many accused criminals would probably assume that a valid 
search warrant gives the police the right to enter the home and 
would not be attuned to the subtleties of knock-and-announce. 
 There is an additional reason to be skeptical about Justice Scalia’s 
concern about a flood of frivolous claims. Motions to suppress are 
filed by criminal defense attorneys. They are not invented from 
whole cloth, but must be based on the police reports or supported by 
affidavits by witnesses. Justice Scalia ignores defense attorneys’ 
ethical obligation not to raise meritless claims or to knowingly allow 
their clients or any other witness to commit perjury.130 Assuming the 
good faith of the defense bar, courts would be flooded with motions to 
suppress for knock-and-announce violations only if the police conduct 
routinely violated the Fourth Amendment or if there was at least a 
colorable claim.  
 Even Justice Scalia’s claim of an enormous “jackpot” “amounting 
in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card” must be viewed with con-
siderable skepticism.131 The exclusionary rule requires suppression of 
the evidence from a particular search; it does not require suppression 
of all evidence from the entire investigation. Particularly in the 
knock-and-announce context, there is reason to believe that applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule would not preclude prosecution, allowing 
criminals to go free. By definition, in order to have a knock-and-
announce violation, the police must have a warrant, as knock-and-
announce is a requirement in executing a warrant.132 A valid search 
warrant can only be issued based on probable cause.133 Thus, the po-
lice must have significant evidence of criminality prior to the search. 
For example, a warrant to search for drugs is often based on an in-
 
 130. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) (standard 4-1.2(f): “[d]efense counsel 
should not intentionally misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court”; standard 4-
7.5(a): “[d]efense counsel should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents, 
tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to take reasonable remedial meas-
ures upon discovery of its falsity”). 
 131. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
 132. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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formant’s or undercover officer’s testimony that they purchased 
drugs (or observed drugs being purchased) from a specific individual 
at a specific location. Although exclusion of the drugs found in an 
improperly executed search might preclude prosecution based on the 
specific quantity of drugs found in the home, it would certainly not 
preclude prosecution for the previously transacted sale.134 Of course, 
in some cases, the exclusionary rule does have a significant impact. If 
all, or virtually all, of the admissible evidence in a given case is ex-
cluded, then exclusion may well prevent a conviction and allow a 
criminal to go free. But in most knock-and-announce cases there will 
still be ample evidence on which to prosecute. In these cases, some 
charges might have to be dropped, but a conviction on some counts, 
or lesser counts may still be achieved.135 Realistically, application of 
the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations in most cases 
would simply put the defendant and his counsel in a better position 
to negotiate a favorable plea bargain.  
 Justice Scalia cites two different types of knock-and-announce 
claims that would lead to extensive litigation “as never before”: “al-
leged failures to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted Rich-
ards justification for a no-knock entry had inadequate support.”136 
They will be addressed separately. 
 Alleged failures to observe the rule would generally fall into two 
categories: complete failure to knock-and-announce or failure to wait 
a reasonable period of time after knocking and announcing before en-
tering forcibly. Obviously a motion to suppress on these grounds 
could be made only if someone was in fact home and did not, in fact, 
answer the door. (If no one were home, the police could claim that 
they had knocked and announced whether they had or not and there 
would be no one to contradict them.137)  In order to make such a mo-
tion, the occupants (or others on the premises) would have to testify 
either that they did not answer the door because they did not hear 
the police knock-and-announce or because they could not get to the 
door before the police barged in. If the police testimony matched that 
of the occupants, then the matter would be resolved. If the police tes-
 
 134. I have personally prosecuted and defended cases where an individual was con-
victed of drug distribution without any evidence that drugs were found in their home or 
indeed, even in their possession. 
 135. For articles and studies discussing the empirical impact of the exclusionary 
rule, see the bibliographical essay in CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING 
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 213-15 (Peter Charles Hoffer & 
N.E.H. Hull eds., 2006). 
 136. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)). 
 137. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982) 
(“Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to 
convict guilty defendants.”). 
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timony contradicted the occupants’ (for example, “we did knock on 
the door and announce our presence, and then we waited a reason-
able period of time before entering”), the trial judge would have to 
determine the relative credibility of the witnesses, make findings of 
fact, and, if she concluded that the police had properly announced 
their presence, determine whether they had waited a reasonable pe-
riod of time under the totality of the circumstances.138 According to 
Justice Scalia, 
[W]hat constituted a “reasonable wait time” in a particular case, 
(or, for that matter, how many seconds the police in fact waited), or 
whether there was “reasonable suspicion” of the sort that would 
invoke the Richards exceptions, is difficult for the trial court to de-
termine and even more difficult for an appellate court to review.139  
E.   The Alleged Difficulty of Resolving Knock-and-Announce Issues 
 Why does the Justice believe these issues would be “difficult for 
the trial court to determine”?140 Why would the issues be “even more 
difficult for an appellate court to review”?141 As for “how many sec-
onds the police in fact waited,”142 this is a simple factual determina-
tion, no more difficult for the trial court than any other fact based on 
testimony. As for the legal issue involved (the reasonableness of the 
wait time), the “totality of the circumstances” test is one that crimi-
nal courts use routinely to evaluate a variety of different issues, such 
as whether consent to search was voluntarily given,143 whether 
anonymous tips furnish probable cause,144 and whether a confession 
was voluntary.145 Justice Scalia offers no explanation of why the to-
tality of the circumstances test of reasonableness would be particu-
larly difficult to apply in the knock-and-announce context other than 
to say that “it is not easy to determine precisely what officers must 
do” because our “reasonable wait time” standard is “necessarily 
vague.”146 He appears to conclude that since the Supreme Court has 
 
 138. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003). 
 139. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. If the length of time that the police waited is an issue that is frequently in con-
tention, the police could easily eliminate this issue by videotaping their execution of the 
warrant, or at least the entry. This could be done through the use of a police videographer, 
a small camera attached to one of the executing officer’s clothes, or, in some cases, a dash-
mounted video camera from a squad car. On the use of video cameras in police work, see 
generally Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice, 
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771 (2005). Another simple option would be for 
the police to use a stopwatch. 
 143. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
 144. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 145. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).  
 146. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003)). 
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enunciated a standard for Fourth Amendment violations that is diffi-
cult to apply, the lower courts should not have to apply it at all.147 
Ironically, Justice Scalia’s concern about the difficulty of applying 
the standard appears to be limited to the context of a motion to sup-
press; he does not seem to be concerned about the lower courts hav-
ing difficulty applying the exact same standard in the context of civil 
damage claims, which he concludes are an effective remedy for 
knock-and-announce violations.148
 The other legal issue that courts might have to determine does not 
seem particularly difficult either. In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court 
held that if the police had reasonable suspicion “that knocking and 
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, 
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective in-
vestigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of 
evidence,” the police could dispense with the knock-and-announce re-
quirement.149 In many jurisdictions, as Justice Breyer notes in his 
dissent, no-knock warrants are available if the police have reasons 
that would justify dispensing with knock-and-announce.150 In such 
cases, the failure to knock-and-announce would be virtually impossi-
ble to challenge since the police could rely in good faith on the war-
rant.151 In Richards, the Court discussed no-knock warrants approv-
ingly: “The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock war-
rants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be 
demonstrated ahead of time.”152  Where the police have chosen to dis-
pense with knocking and announcing without prior judicial approval, 
they simply had to provide “some minimal level of objective justifica-
tion” for their decision.153 The “reasonable suspicion” standard pre-
scribed by Richards is routinely applied by courts in a variety of con-
texts, such as evaluating the legality of Terry stops and frisks,154 
weapon searches of automobiles,155 protective sweeps of residences,156 
and temporary seizures of property.157 It is unclear why Justice 
Scalia believes the reasonable suspicion standard would be any 
more difficult to apply in this context.158 Logic suggests that it 
would not be. 
 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 2167-68. 
 149. 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
 150. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 151. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984). 
 152. 520 U.S. at 396 n.7. 
 153. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984). 
 154. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 155. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034-35 (1983). 
 156. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). 
 157. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983). 
 158. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).  
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 Justice Scalia also claims that knock-and-announce motions to sup-
press are harder to resolve than other types of motions to suppress:  
Unlike the warrant or Miranda requirements, compliance with 
which is readily determined (either there was or was not a war-
rant; either the Miranda warning was given, or it was not) . . . 
[knock-and-announce issues are] difficult for the trial court to de-
termine and even more difficult for an appellate court to review.159  
 Scrutiny of this argument quickly exposes its shortcomings. De-
termining compliance with the requirements of Miranda160 is rarely 
a simple matter of whether Miranda warnings were given. There are 
frequently more complex issues involved in motions to suppress 
statements under Miranda. First, there are the threshold issues of 
whether Miranda warnings are required. Was the suspect in custody 
when he made the statement?161 Was the suspect subjected to inter-
rogation prior to making the statement?162 Then, once it has been de-
termined that Miranda warnings should have been given, there is 
frequently litigation over not only whether the warnings were given, 
but whether they were adequately given163 and understood. If the 
Miranda warnings were given, there may be litigation over whether 
the rights were knowingly and intelligently waived164 or properly in-
voked.165 On all these issues, the police officers and the suspect 
rarely agree on the facts surrounding how a confession was obtained. 
Thus, it is up to the judge to determine the relative credibility of the 
witnesses and make findings of facts to support his or her conclu-
sions of law. It cannot be seriously argued that the issues surround-
ing knock-and-announce are more difficult for courts to handle than 
issues surrounding the admissibility of confessions. 
 Similarly, Justice Scalia’s claim that compliance with the Court’s 
warrant requirements is “readily determined” is a conclusion without 
a factual basis.166 Motions to suppress based on Fourth Amendment 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 161. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 435 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983). 
 162. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (stating that interrogation is 
not only “express questioning,” but its “functional equivalent”—“any words or actions on the 
part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response from the suspect”); see also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526 (1987). 
 163. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 200-02 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 
355, 358-59 (1981). 
 164. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
315 (1985); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1979). 
 165. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (ambiguous request for counsel); 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1984) (ambiguous request for counsel); Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (assertion of right to counsel); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 100-02 (1975) (assertion of right to remain silent). 
 166. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006). 
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search issues rarely are as easy as determining whether there was a 
warrant, a fact which would be readily ascertainable. If there was 
not a warrant for a search, then the courts must deal with the 
threshold question of whether a search was conducted at all; that is, 
whether there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the place 
the evidence was observed.167 This can involve difficult questions 
such as whether the police used technology not generally in public 
use168 and whether the area observed was “curtilage” or “open 
fields.”169 Assuming there was a search without a warrant, the court 
must determine whether the warrantless search or entry was justi-
fied by one of the ever-expanding list of exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement, such as search incident to arrest,170 exigent circumstance 
searches,171 certain vehicle and container searches,172 or entry for 
emergencies or public safety.173 Another frequently contested issue is 
whether consent was given for a warrantless search.174  If there was 
a warrant, the courts must still deal with the issues of whether the 
warrant was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate,175 
whether there was probable cause to support the warrant176 (or the 
police believed in good faith that there was),177 whether the warrant 
stated the place to be searched178 and the items to be seized179 with 
sufficient particularity, and whether the police exceeded the scope of 
the warrant during their search.180  Can it credibly be maintained 
that these issues are simpler to resolve than knock-and-announce is-
sues? In short, the alleged difficulty of resolving knock-and-announce 
issues in motions to suppress compared to other types of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment issues is not a convincing argument for declining to 
apply the exclusionary rule to this category of Fourth Amendment vio-
lations.  
 
 167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 168. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 169. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). 
 170. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754-55 (1969). 
 171. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). 
 172. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
386, 390 (1985); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1977). 
 173. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). 
 174. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). 
 175. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979); Johnson v. 
U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 176. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
 177. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). 
 178. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 
498, 501 (1925). 
 179. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976); Marron v. United States, 275 
U.S. 192, 195 (1927). 
 180. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 817-18 (1982). 
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F.   The Danger of Over-Deterrence 
 Justice Scalia next argues that applying the exclusionary rule 
(“the incongruent remedy”) would lead to “police officers’ refraining 
from timely entry after knocking and announcing” because “officers 
would be inclined to wait longer than the law requires” since it would 
be hard for them to decide exactly how long they must wait.181 Jus-
tice Scalia suggests that this unnecessary delay in entry would “pro-
duc[e] preventable violence against officers in some cases, and the 
destruction of evidence in many others.”182 Of course, if the police 
have any indication of a threat to themselves or of the destruction of 
evidence, they do not have to knock and announce at all.183 If they 
develop reasonable suspicion after they knock (from sounds they 
hear from within the home, for example) they do not have to wait be-
fore entering.184 What Justice Scalia apparently envisions is a situa-
tion where the police have no suspicion whatsoever of danger and 
have no reason to believe that evidence will be destroyed, but the 
danger exists nonetheless. Justice Scalia suggests that the police 
should wait the absolute bare minimum amount of time permitted by 
the Constitution—an amount of time that he has characterized as 
“necessarily vague”185—and not a moment longer. What Justice 
Scalia really seems to be saying is that knowledge that the exclu-
sionary rule could be applied would cause the police to be too cau-
tious in respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.  
 There are no other contexts where the Court has refused to apply 
the exclusionary rule because it would cause the police to go beyond 
constitutional requirements, although one could make a similar ar-
gument almost any time the exclusionary rule is applied. Under this 
view, out of fear that evidence of a search will be excluded, police will 
go beyond the absolute bare minimum in gathering evidence to sup-
port probable cause for a search warrant. The delay would increase 
the danger that evidence would be hidden or destroyed. Similarly, 
because an arrest without probable cause will lead to suppression of 
fruit of the arrest (such as incriminating statements made by the 
suspect or evidence found on the suspect), police will be reluctant to 
arrest people and will wait until they have more than probable cause. 
This would also leave dangerous suspects on the loose to commit 
more crimes or perhaps to flee, never to be brought to justice. In 
short, Justice Scalia concludes that the exclusionary rule is danger-
ous because it may cause officers to be too sensitive to Fourth 
 
 181. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006) 
 182. Id. 
 183. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
 184. Id. at 396. 
 185. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. 
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Amendment concerns, thereby hampering their crime-fighting ef-
forts. Assuming for the moment that Justice Scalia is right about the 
risks to efficient law enforcement, there is another problem with this 
argument. According to Justice Scalia, the appropriate remedy to 
prevent knock-and-announce violations is a suit for civil damages.186 
If the threat of a civil suit is an equally effective deterrent to the po-
lice going into homes too early, why would it not also cause them to 
hesitate too long? In other words, any effective deterrent could theo-
retically cause the police to err on the side of caution, thus this “cost” 
is simply unavoidable. If Justice Scalia believes that the threat of a 
civil suit would not cause police to hesitate beyond the minimum 
time required to the same extent as exclusion of the evidence, then 
that is essentially an admission that civil remedies are not as effec-
tive a deterrent. 
G.   The Need for Deterrence and the Effectiveness of the Exclusionary 
Rule as a Deterrent 
 After considering the “social costs” of applying the exclusionary 
rule, Justice Scalia then weighs these costs against the benefit of the 
exclusionary rule: deterrence of police misconduct.187 “Next to these 
‘substantial social costs’ we must consider the deterrence benefits, 
existence of which is a necessary condition for exclusion.”188  Accord-
ing to the Justice, deterrence is not required because the police have 
no good reason to violate knock-and-announce rules in the first place, 
especially compared to other Fourth Amendment requirements that 
they might violate: 
To begin with, the value of deterrence depends upon the strength 
of the incentive to commit the forbidden act. Viewed from this per-
spective, deterrence of knock-and-announce violations is not worth 
a lot. Violation of the warrant requirement sometimes produces in-
criminating evidence that could not otherwise be obtained. But ig-
noring knock-and-announce can realistically be expected to achieve 
absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of evidence 
and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of 
the premises—dangers which, if there is even “reasonable suspi-
cion” of their existence, suspend the knock-and-announce require-
ment anyway. Massive deterrence is hardly required.189
 
 186. Id. at 2167-68.  
 187. Id. at 2166. 
 188. Id.   
 189. Id. 
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 There are a number of flaws with this argument.190 One obvious 
flaw is that over a decade after Wilson v. Arkansas191 was decided, 
during which both the exclusionary rule (in many jurisdictions) and 
civil remedies (in all jurisdictions) were available, knock-and-
announce violations are still occurring with some regularity.192 So, 
obviously there is some reason the police choose to violate knock-and-
announce. Justice Scalia can think of only two reasons why the police 
might ignore the requirement: prevention of destruction of evidence 
and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance.193 But, as Justice 
Scalia himself notes, if the police have a reasonable suspicion of ei-
ther of these dangers, knock-and-announce is suspended.194 So, logi-
cally, there must be some reason why the police violate knock-and-
announce when they do not have a reasonable suspicion of danger. 
Justice Breyer offers one possibility: “[S]ome government officers will 
find it easier, or believe it less risky, to proceed with what they con-
sider a necessary search immediately and without the requisite con-
stitutional (say, warrant or knock-and-announce) compliance.”195
 Another, less innocuous possibility is that police may believe that 
breaking in and catching a suspect unaware (without a chance to 
“collect oneself,” as Justice Scalia characterized it196) will give the po-
lice an investigatory edge. Feeling overwhelmed and vulnerable, a 
suspect might make spontaneous admissions, or, if arrested after the 
search yields incriminating evidence, the suspect, still reeling from 
being caught off guard, might be more inclined to cooperate and con-
fess. Other police may be more concerned with exercising their au-
thority than they are about the evidentiary issues and may have lit-
tle regard for the personal dignity of those whom they investigate.  
 Professor Gerald Uelman raises another possible incentive for po-
lice to violate knock-and-announce. Responding to Justice Scalia’s 
argument that the police have no evidentiary incentive for knock-
and-announce violations, he notes that “[w]ith an arrest warrant, 
however, the incentive may actually be quite different. An unan-
 
 190. One problem with Justice Scalia’s argument is that it assumes that the only justi-
fication or value of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct—a debatable 
point, but one which has been debated at great length by other scholars, so I will not dis-
cuss it here. See supra note 135. For articles discussing the merits of the exclusionary rule, 
or lack thereof, see ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 124-30 (2003) (bibliographic es-
say listing leading articles) and LONG, supra note 135, at 211-13 (bibliographic essay list-
ing leading articles); see also generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 47, §§ 1.1-1.2 (summarizing  
the debate surrounding the exclusionary rule). 
 191. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 192. See supra note 21. 
 193. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 2165 (majority opinion). 
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nounced entry can expand the scope of the permissible search.”197 
Similar to a search warrant, the police are required to knock and an-
nounce their purpose when executing an arrest warrant at a private 
home.198 If the suspect surrenders himself at the front door, the po-
lice have no authority to search the home, other than perhaps a cur-
sory search around the entry.199 However, if the police ignore knock-
and-announce and enter the home to arrest the suspect within, in an 
upstairs bedroom for example, then the police can get a free search of 
everything in plain view on the way in and out, plus additional areas 
incident to arrest, or as part of a protective sweep.200 Although Hud-
son did not specifically state that it would apply to arrest warrants, 
according to Professor Uelman, there is “little hope of limiting the ra-
tionale of Hudson to search warrants.”201
 Clearly, recognition that the tendency to abuse power is inevitable 
in any organization which has authority over the citizenry was one of 
the underlying bases for both Fourth Amendment protections and 
the application of the exclusionary rule to enforce them. These 
abuses are inevitably most often applied to those whom the police 
may view as undesirable—for example, criminal suspects or mem-
bers of minority groups. Justice Scalia not only discounts these pos-
sibilities, but implies that he does not care whether the police are de-
terred by civil suits.202 As he makes clear, even if the threat of suit 
has no deterrent effect, he would still not be willing to apply the 
exclusionary rule: 
 It seems to us not even true, as Hudson contends, that without 
suppression there will be no deterrence of knock-and-announce 
violations at all. Of course even if this assertion were accurate, it 
would not necessarily justify suppression. Assuming (as the asser-
tion must) that civil suit is not an effective deterrent, one can 
think of many forms of police misconduct that are similarly “unde-
terred.” When, for example, a confessed suspect in the killing of a 
police officer, arrested (along with incriminating evidence) in a 
lawful warranted search, is subjected to physical abuse at the sta-
tion house, would it seriously be suggested that the evidence must 
be excluded, since that is the only “effective deterrent”? And what, 
other than civil suit, is the “effective deterrent” of police violation 
of an already-confessed suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights by de-
nying him prompt access to counsel? Many would regard these vio-
lated rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded 
upon in one’s nightclothes—and yet nothing but “ineffective” civil 
 
 197. Uelman, supra note 118, at 62. 
 198. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). 
 199. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). 
 200. Id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
 201. Uelman, supra note 118, at 62.  
 202. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166-67 (2006). 
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suit is available as a deterrent. And the police incentive for those 
violations is arguably greater than the incentive for disregarding 
the knock-and-announce rule.203
 The gist of Justice Scalia’s argument is that we cannot or do not 
deter all forms of police misconduct through use of the exclusionary 
rule, so why should we bother to apply the rule to deter this particu-
lar form of police misconduct, which is not even that serious?204 To 
bolster his position, Justice Scalia provides two examples of police 
misconduct where the exclusionary rules do not apply.205 In the first 
example, a confessed suspect who has killed a police officer is ar-
rested, and during a lawful warranted search the police find addi-
tional incriminating evidence.206 The police then abuse the suspect at 
the stationhouse.207
 Let’s look at this example more closely. It appears that the police 
have an airtight case: a lawful confession, plus corroborating physi-
cal evidence.208 According to Justice Scalia, the police, nevertheless, 
still have an “arguably greater” incentive to physically abuse the 
suspect while in police custody.209 But the Justice has just stated that 
“the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive 
to commit the forbidden act.”210 The normal incentive for the police to 
violate the Constitution is presumably the desire to gather incrimi-
nating evidence to convict criminals, what the Court has referred to 
as the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”211 Indeed, Jus-
tice Scalia notes that violating the “warrant requirement sometimes 
produces incriminating evidence that could not otherwise be ob-
tained.”212 This suggests that he believes that the incentive to violate 
the Constitution is to gather evidence. Justice Scalia also seems to be 
alluding to another incentive—the desire to beat a suspect out of an-
ger, frustration, or vengeance, even though it will not advance the 
investigation in any way and could surely hinder it. Justice Scalia 
does not account for the strong disincentives to abuse a suspect, such 
as the credibility problems this will create for the officers involved, 
the risk of personal liability, the loss of employment, and the disci-
plinary and criminal sanctions that may follow.  
 Is a jury likely to believe the word of police officers who physically 
attack a suspect? Will they believe that the confession allegedly ob-
 
 203. Id. (emphasis added). 
 204. See id.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 2167. 
 208. Id. at 2166-67. 
 209. Id. at 2167.  
 210. Id. at 2166. 
 211. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).  
 212. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
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tained before the beating was truly voluntarily given and that the 
evidence was found where it was claimed to be found? Would not a 
jury or judge be suspicious of the actions of a police department that 
would allow a suspect in custody to be physically abused? Would the 
police really run the risk of losing the prosecution of a vicious crimi-
nal just to have a chance to beat him up? Justice Scalia seems to 
think so. Yet he can not seem to imagine any dark motives the police 
might have to violate knock-and-announce. In a confusing part of the 
opinion, Justice Scalia refers to the highly professional nature of the 
modern police force and concludes that the exclusionary rule is un-
necessary because police are unlikely to violate citizen’s rights.213 It 
is as if any argument that would bolster the conclusion that 
knock-and-announce is not significant will be cited without either 
analysis or even concern that it might contradict other aspects of 
the opinion’s reasoning. 
 There is another problem with this example. Justice Scalia sug-
gests that if a civil suit is, as Hudson argued, an ineffective remedy 
for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, then it must also be 
an ineffective remedy for police abuse of prisoners.214 There are obvi-
ous differences in these two situations which might make a civil 
remedy more effective in one versus the other. The main difference is 
that when the police physically abuse a suspect, there is physical 
evidence; it is not simply a matter of the testimony of the suspect 
that his or her rights were violated. The victim of police brutality can 
prove the abuse through concrete factual evidence. Second, it is far 
easier to prove damages in a police brutality case as opposed to a 
knock-and-announce case. It is hard to put a monetary value on a 
violation of privacy, and a jury is unlikely to be sympathetic to a 
criminal suspect’s hurt feelings. Thus, any damages would likely be 
nominal and of little interest to private attorneys. In contrast, dam-
age awards in police brutality cases are frequently substantial.215 
While there would undoubtedly be plaintiffs’ attorneys eager to rep-
resent a physically abused suspect, few attorneys would as readily 
agree to pursue a knock-and-announce civil suit. 
 
 213. Id. at 2168. 
 214. Id. at 2166-67. 
 215. For example, in the infamous Rodney King case in Los Angeles, a jury in 1994 
awarded Mr. King $3.8 million in compensatory damages. Rodney King Is Awarded $3.8 
Million, NY TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A14. The King beating, memorably caught on video-
tape, precipitated major race riots when the officers involved were acquitted of police bru-
tality charges on April 29, 1992. Riots in Los Angeles, NY TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A1, l. 
More recently, in the high profile case of Abner Louima, the Haitian immigrant who was 
abused by members of the New York Police Department, the case was settled out of court 
in July 2001 for $8.75 million. City Settles Suit in Louima Torture, NY TIMES, Jul. 13, 
2001, at A1. 
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 Justice Scalia asks, “[W]ould it seriously be suggested that the 
evidence must be excluded” in this instance (the beaten suspect)?216 
Although the answer is obviously “no,” the question is irrelevant. The 
exclusionary rule is clearly not appropriate in this instance because 
the evidence was obtained lawfully, prior to the beating.217 Since the 
situations being compared are not comparable, the use of the exam-
ple is misleading.  
 The second example given by Justice Scalia is “police violation of 
an already-confessed suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights by denying 
him prompt access to counsel.”218 It is not clear exactly what the Jus-
tice is referring to. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
attach until adversary judicial criminal proceedings have com-
menced219—typically, when a person has been formally charged with 
a crime. After this point, the police may not deliberately elicit in-
criminating information from the accused in the absence of defense 
counsel.220 If the police deliberately elicit incriminating information, 
the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule does apply—the statements 
are inadmissible.221 Justice Breyer apparently also found this exam-
ple confusing. Justice Breyer thought Justice Scalia was referring to 
a situation where a “suspect confesses, then police apparently arrest 
him, take him to [sic] station, and refuse to tell him of his right to 
counsel.”222 Of course, informing a suspect of his right to counsel is 
part of the Miranda right to counsel to prevent compelled self-
incrimination.223 This right to counsel is generally considered sepa-
rate from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.224 Failure to inform 
a suspect of his Miranda right to counsel would render any subse-
quent statement in response to questioning inadmissible.225  
 So what exactly is the police incentive to deny prompt access to 
counsel to which Justice Scalia refers? It cannot be to continue to try 
to extract information from the suspect which would inevitably be 
suppressed. The only other possibility would be that the police deny 
prompt access to counsel simply because it would interfere with their 
dominion over suspects in custody. There is no explanation of why 
Justice Scalia feels the incentive to deny prompt access to counsel is 
“arguably greater” than the incentive to violate knock-and-
 
 216. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2167.   
 217. Id. at 2166-67. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 fn.6 (1964). 
 220. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 223. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). 
 224. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991). 
 225. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000). 
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announce.226 According to Justice Scalia, violating knock-and-
announce could be a life-or-death matter.227 What equivalent value is 
there to the police to refuse access to counsel? And why would a 
highly professional police force that respects citizens’ rights (as Jus-
tice Scalia characterizes modern officers)228 want to deny this right, 
especially when they already had enough evidence for the prosecutor 
to file formal charges? Justice Scalia does not address these questions. 
H.   The Adequacy of Other Deterrents 
 After explaining why there is little need for deterrence of knock-
and-announce violations and little deterrence value in using the ex-
clusionary rule, Justice Scalia next explains that there are already 
adequate deterrents to knock-and-announce violations: “[T]he extant 
deterrences against them are substantial.”229 The primary deterrents 
he refers to are civil damage suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for suits 
against state officers and municipalities)230 and Bivens actions (for 
suits against federal officers).231 “As far as we know, civil liability is 
an effective deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other con-
texts.”232 Here, Justice Scalia seems to be borrowing from Judge Pos-
ner’s opinion in United States v. Langford:233  
[W]e hold that violation of the [knock-and-announce] rule does not 
authorize exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to the ensuing 
search. . . . There are contrary decisions. . . . The concern that 
animates those decisions is that unless evidence obtained in a 
search that violates the knock-and-announce rule is excluded, 
there will be no deterrent to such violations. But that is not true 
now that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Bivens doctrine have made tort 
damages an effective remedy for constitutional violations by fed-
eral or state law enforcement officers.234
 Judge Posner did not offer any support for the proposition that 
tort damages are an effective remedy;235 Justice Scalia at least 
tried.236 However, the case cited by Justice Scalia for the proposition 
 
 226. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167.   
 227. Id. at 2165. 
 228. Id. at 2168.  
 229. Id.  
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  
 231. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).   
 232. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (citing Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 
(2001)).
 233. 314 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 234. Id. at 894-95 (citations omitted).  
 235. For two useful critiques of United States v. Langford, see Amy Garzon, Com-
ment, United States v. Langford, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353 (2003), and Loly Garcia Tor, 
Note, Mandating Exclusion for Violations of the Knock and Announce Rule, 83 B.U. L. REV. 
853 (2003). 
 236. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68.  
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that civil damages are an effective remedy is not relevant to the issue 
in Hudson. The case of Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko ad-
dressed whether Bivens actions should be extended to allow an in-
mate to sue a private contractor operating a halfway house on behalf 
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons when the inmate alleged that he 
had been treated in a cruel and unusual way.237 The Court held that 
they should not.238 Not only did this case not involve a choice of 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule, it did not even involve police 
investigation of a crime or even police misconduct.  
 Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court simply to “assume” that 
civil remedies are an adequate substitute for the exclusionary rule, 
without requiring any evidence that they are? Is it a reasonable as-
sumption, supported by logic and common sense?  Professors Chris-
topher Slobogin and Charles Whitebread cite several reasons why 
this assumption is dubious, including the relative rarity of damages 
actions.239 In addition, according to these scholars,  
[u]nder current law, a damages suit is not feasible when damages 
are negligible, as is the case with many Fourth Amendment (and 
other constitutional) violations, and the victim poor, as are most 
persons investigated by the police. Even if damages are sizeable, a 
civil suit is unlikely to be attractive; since constitutional violations 
will often be the result of idiosyncratic misconduct rather than 
government policy, the (often judgment proof) officer will usually 
be the only legitimate defendant, at least in state litigation. More-
over, most individuals with possible damages claims will be 
charged with a criminal offense; because they will be incarcerated 
or feel estopped by some notion of “unclean hands” they will sel-
dom bring a civil suit.240
These authors also note the proven impact of the exclusionary rule in 
leading to changes in police training.241  
 Ironically, among the class of people who are victims of knock-
and-announce violations, those who would potentially benefit from 
the exclusionary rule (those against whom incriminating evidence is 
found in the subsequent search) are the least likely to take advan-
tage of the civil remedies available. It is not just the difficulty of 
bringing suit while incarcerated or a notion of “unclean hands” that 
is likely to prevent guilty victims from filing suit. These individuals, 
who most likely will become criminally accused shortly after the 
search is completed, have distinct disincentives to sue the police offi-
 
 237. 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). 
 238. Id. 
 239. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 58-59 
(Found. Press 4th ed. 2000). 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 59.   
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cers and the government that the innocent victims of knock-and-
announce violations do not have. The fate of the accused criminal de-
pends, in large measure, on the goodwill of (or at least a lack of 
strong negative attitude by) the police and prosecutors—local gov-
ernment officials. Favorable charging decisions and plea bargains are 
matters of discretion for these officials, and an accused criminal 
would be foolish to antagonize the police and government by suing 
them at a time when his fate was in their hands. Even if the accused 
criminal could wait until after the case had been resolved before fil-
ing suit, there are still matters of parole and probation decisions, 
place of incarceration, treatment by prison guards, and the like. Law 
enforcement officers, including corrections officers, are a brother-
hood, and there are myriad ways they can make a troublesome de-
fendants or prisoner’s life difficult. Retaliation and harassment 
would be easy for the police to undertake and extremely difficult to 
prove. For example, the Supreme Court recently decided that police 
may conduct suspicionless searches of parolees at any time, an un-
precedented invitation to police harassment.242 The Court has also 
decided that a citizen can be arrested for the slightest infraction 
(even a fine-only offense such as a seat-belt violation) and subjected 
to a search of their person incident to arrest, an inventory search of 
their belongings, and detention for forty-eight hours.243 The Court 
will not consider the subjective motivation of the officers in such a 
case, so an officer bent on harassing an individual could do so with 
little fear of being second-guessed.244 In short, an accused or con-
victed criminal would have strong incentives to avoid the unwanted 
attention from law enforcement that a civil lawsuit might bring. The 
majority fails to account for this. 
 Justice Breyer strongly refuted the majority’s assumption that 
civil damages are adequate, calling it, in unusually direct language, 
“a support-free assumption.”245 Justice Breyer noted that 
the majority, like Michigan and the United States, has failed to 
cite a single reported case in which a plaintiff has collected more 
than nominal damages solely as a result of a knock-and-announce 
violation. Even Michigan concedes that, “in cases like the present 
one . . . , damages may be virtually non-existent.”246
 
 242. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006). 
 243. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); see also Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 244. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 245. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2175 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 2174 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 35, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 
2159 (2006) (No.4-1360)). The United States submitted a brief and argued in support 
of Michigan’s position that the exclusionary rule should not apply. Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 
(2006) (No. 4-1360). 
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 Justice Scalia responded to the argument that it would be diffi-
cult to find a lawyer to take on a case where minimal damages 
would be involved:  
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) answers this objection. Since some civil-rights 
violations would yield damages too small to justify the expense of 
litigation, Congress has authorized attorney’s fees for civil-rights 
plaintiffs. This remedy was unavailable in the heydays of our ex-
clusionary-rule jurisprudence, because it is tied to the availability 
of a cause of action. For years after Mapp, “very few lawyers would 
even consider representation of persons who had civil rights claims 
against the police,” but now “much has changed. Citizens and law-
yers are much more willing to seek relief in the courts for police 
misconduct.” The number of public-interest law firms and lawyers 
who specialize in civil-rights grievances has greatly expanded.247
 Although Justice Scalia’s general observations may arguably be 
true, he has overlooked some issues specific to knock-and-announce 
that cast doubt on the premise that lawyers and citizens are likely to 
sue for damages for such violations. For example, although attorney’s 
fees are available for civil rights plaintiffs, they are not available to 
all plaintiffs equally. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) limits 
the recovery of attorney’s fees to 150% of actual damages in any suit 
brought by a prisoner.248 If the damages from a knock-and-announce 
violation are too small to justify the expense of a lawsuit, then the 
prospect of multiplying those damages one and a half times for attor-
ney’s fees is still unlikely to entice many attorneys to take the case.249  
 
 247. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167 (majority opinion) (quoting MICHAEL AVERY, DAVID 
RUDOVSKY & KAREN BLUM, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION v (West 3d ed. 
2005) (second quote)) (citations omitted). The reference to the Avery, Rudovsky, and Blum 
text is another example of Justice Scalia’s citation of a scholarly work on a specific point in 
support of a broader proposition not supported by the authors. See id. David Rudovsky, a 
nationally prominent criminal defense and civil rights attorney and a Senior Fellow at the 
University of Pennyslvania Law School, has criticized the exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule and the limited nature of civil rights damages and injunctive relief. See David Ru-
dovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199. Mr. Rudovsky, who agreed to be quoted for this Article, states, 
“[T]he cite to our book is disingenuous. The fact that there may be some remedies for police 
misconduct in some contexts does not begin to answer the question as to remedies for 
knock and announce violations. Particularly where contraband is found, I can state quite 
categorically there are no realistic remedies.” E-mail from David Rudovsky, Senior Fel-
low, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to author (Oct. 19, 2006, 8:36 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 248. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2000). 
 249. See, e.g., Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
when prisoner’s suit based on Fourth Amendment violation yielded $1.00 in nominal dam-
ages, the PLRA limited the award of attorney’s fees to $1.50; district court’s award of at-
torney’s fees in amount of $9680 was reversed); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (reversing award of $34,493.72 in attorney’s fees when prisoner was awarded 
$426 in damages and PLRA limited recoverable attorney’s fees at $629).  
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 Also, before consulting a lawyer about pursuing a knock-and-
announce suit, citizens have to know or at least suspect that their 
rights have been violated. The average citizen knows that the police 
are not supposed to physically abuse them; they may not know that 
the police are required to announce their presence and wait a rea-
sonable time when executing a search warrant. Police television 
shows frequently feature SWAT teams breaking into suspects’ homes 
unannounced; the average American may assume this is standard 
operating procedure. The exclusionary remedy is effective because 
the criminally accused, regardless of their ability to pay, are guaran-
teed counsel to closely scrutinize the actions of the police, explain to 
defendants their rights, and help them to exercise their rights. Al-
though beyond the scope of their representation, a few criminal de-
fense attorneys (especially those in private practice) might inform 
their clients about the possibility of filing suit. But the average pub-
lic defender or appointed counsel can hardly be expected to do so, 
given the limited time they are likely to have to spend with their cli-
ents. As there is no comparable cadre of attorneys who are paid by 
the government to monitor the actions of the police with an eye toward 
filing civil damage suits for constitutional violations, many innocent 
victims of knock-and-announce violations may never get legal advice.  
 Justice Scalia fails to address another obvious point. Bivens suits 
have been available since 1971,250 and § 1983 claims have been avail-
able since Monroe v. Pape251 was decided in 1961. If the threat of civil 
suits were as effective a deterrent as Justice Scalia suggests,252 one 
would assume that police violations of constitutional rights should 
have been virtually eliminated by now. But Justice Scalia offers no 
empirical evidence that the threat of being sued has deterred the po-
lice or resulted in a measurable diminution of serious violations of 
the rights of criminal suspects.  
 A popular criminal procedure treatise treats the notion that civil 
damages are an adequate substitute for the exclusionary rule succinctly:  
In sum, although civil actions are sometimes available—and suc-
cessful—as a remedy in damages for some specific instances of es-
pecially egregious police misconduct, experience has demonstrated 
that such civil lawsuits are too sporadic and idiosyncratic to serve 
to effectively prevent law enforcement officers from engaging in 
unconstitutional activity or to otherwise remedy this problem.253
 
 250. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 251. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 252. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68. 
 253. WEAVER, ABRAMSON, BURKOFF & HANCOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
242 (2004). 
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 Another commentator, focusing specifically on the use of civil ac-
tions in the knock-and-announce context, concludes, “various legal 
hurdles and limitations make lodging a sustainable claim for breach 
of the ‘knock and announce’ rule an arduous proposition.”254
I.   The Professionalism of Modern Police Forces 
 Lacking any hard evidence to suggest that civil damages deter po-
lice, Justice Scalia offers an alternative argument: the exclusionary 
rule is no longer necessary because “modern police forces are staffed 
with professionals.”255
 Another development over the past half-century that deters 
civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police 
forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline. . . . 
[W]e now have increasing evidence that police forces across the 
United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously. 
There have been “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, 
and supervision of police officers.” Numerous sources are now 
available to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of 
them under this Court’s cases, how to respect constitutional guar-
antees in various situations, and how to craft an effective regime 
for internal discipline.256
 There can be no question that modern police forces are, by and 
large, more professional, better trained, and more concerned with the 
constitutional rights of citizens than their predecessors. What Justice 
Scalia overlooks is why this change has occurred. The single largest 
driving force behind this trend has been the exclusion of evidence 
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments’ exclusionary 
rules.257 Concern over losing valid incriminating evidence in a sup-
 
 254. E. Martin Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock 
and Announce Rule” and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 79 
(2005). See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law En-
forcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 247, 284-86 (1988).
 255. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 256. Id. (quoting SAMUEL E. WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM 51 (1993)). 
 257. Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at 5, avail-
able at 2006 WLNR 10986191. Professor Walker made this point in an editorial shortly af-
ter Hudson was announced, accusing Justice Scalia of violating Walker’s “intellectual in-
tegrity” because “[Scalia] twisted [Walker’s] main argument to reach a conclusion the exact 
opposite of what [he] spelled out in [Taming the System] and other studies.” Id. He contin-
ued on to say: 
Scalia’s opinion suggests that the results I highlighted have sufficiently re-
moved the need for an exclusionary rule to act as a judicial-branch watchdog 
over the police. I have never said or even suggested such a thing. To the con-
trary, I have argued that the results reinforce the Supreme Court’s continuing 
importance in defining constitutional protections for individual rights and requir-
ing the appropriate remedies for violations, including the exclusion of evidence.  
Id. 
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pression motion, thereby allowing a criminal to go free, is the reason 
that police departments “teach officers and their supervisors what is 
required of them under this Court’s cases” and “how to respect con-
stitutional guarantees in various situations.”258
 However professional modern police forces may be, it is clear that 
the police will continue to press the constitutional boundaries in 
their understandable drive to arrest and convict criminals. The police 
monitor Supreme Court decisions in the criminal procedure area the 
way accountants monitor changes to the Internal Revenue Code. 
They are constantly looking for any advantage or loophole. Good ex-
amples of this can be seen in the cases of Oregon v. Elstad259 and 
Missouri v. Seibert.260 In Elstad, the Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment does not require “the suppression of a confession, made 
after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely 
because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned 
admission from the defendant.”261 “[T]he officer’s initial failure to 
warn” in Elstad was characterized in Seibert as an “oversight” and “a 
good-faith Miranda mistake.”262 Yet in direct response to Elstad, 
many police departments dramatically changed their interrogations 
tactics to intentionally omit Miranda warnings during initial inter-
rogations.263 This disturbing trend was later addressed by the Court: 
 The technique of interrogating in successive, unwarned and 
warned phases raises a new challenge to Miranda. Although we 
have no statistics on the frequency of this practice, it is not con-
fined to Rolla, Missouri. An officer of that police department testi-
fied that the strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after 
interrogating and drawing out a confession was promoted not only 
by his own department, but by a national police training organiza-
tion and other departments in which he had worked. Consistently 
with the officer’s testimony, the Police Law Institute, for example, 
instructs that “officers may conduct a two-stage interrogation. . . . 
At any point during the pre-Miranda interrogation, usually after 
arrestees have confessed, officers may then read the Miranda 
warnings and ask for a waiver. If the arrestees waive their 
Miranda rights, officers will be able to repeat any subsequent in-
criminating statements later in court.” The upshot of all this ad-
vice is a question-first practice of some popularity, as one can see 
from the reported cases describing its use, sometimes in obedience 
to department policy.264
 
 258. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 259. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 260. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 261. 470 U.S. at 303. 
 262. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614-15. 
 263. See id. at 609-11. 
 264. Id. (citations omitted). 
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 The police procedures adopted by many police departments in re-
sponse to Elstad would have subjected them to potential liability in § 
1983 civil suits because they encouraged clear constitutional viola-
tions.265 The police recognized they were violating Miranda because 
they knew any incriminating statements made during pre-Miranda 
interrogations would be suppressed. As Justice Kennedy commented 
in concurrence in Seibert, “[t]he police used a two-step questioning 
technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda.”266
 The Seibert case demonstrates that the police will adopt whatever 
tactics they can aggressively implement if they can increase their 
conviction rate and not be overturned on appeal, even to the point of 
intentionally violating constitutional mandates, without regard to 
the potential for civil damage suits.267 A similar change in police tac-
tics can be expected in light of Hudson. Of course, police departments 
will still provide training on knock-and-announce consistent with 
Wilson, Banks, Ramirez, and Richards, thereby eliminating the risk 
of municipal liability suggested by Justice Scalia as an additional de-
terrent,268 but this training will be undoubtedly be supplemented 
with an explanation that violations of knock-and-announce no longer 
will result in suppression of evidence. It will be up to individual po-
lice officers to weigh the risks of a civil lawsuit and internal disci-
pline against whatever perceived advantage they may derive from 
violating knock-and-announce. This is an invitation to abuse by un-
scrupulous officers. Indeed, by citing the salutary effects of violating 
knock-and-announce (protecting the lives of officers and avoiding the 
destruction of evidence), Justice Scalia almost seems to be encourag-
ing violations of knock-and-announce.269
IV.   PLACING HUDSON IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPREME COURT 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE JURISPRUDENCE 
A.   The Trend of the Court to Minimize the Potential for Police 
Abuses and Limit the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule 
 Justice Scalia’s lack of concern about the incentive for unscrupu-
lous officers to violate knock-and-announce reflects a deep division 
between the attitudes of the most conservative and most liberal fac-
tions of the Court toward the police, a division that can be seen in 
numerous cases. The more liberal wing, led by Justice Stevens and 
including Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, is far more concerned about 
 
 265. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 266. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 267. See generally id.   
 268. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006) (“Failure to teach and enforce 
constitutional requirements exposes municipalities to financial liability.”) 
 269. Id. at 2166. 
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officers acting in bad faith; the more conservative Justices, led by 
Justice Scalia and currently including Justices Thomas and Alito and 
Chief Justice Roberts, are more inclined to tolerate broad police dis-
cretion if it will result in greater police efficiency and higher convic-
tion rates.270 The more centrist Justices—Justice Souter, Justice 
Kennedy, and recently retired Justice O’Connor—have tended to be 
the swing votes in these cases.271 This divide is by no means a new 
phenomenon. The issue of balancing the need for effective law en-
forcement against the potential incentives for police misconduct, es-
pecially where the admissibility of incriminating evidence rule is in-
volved, has been a recurring theme on the Court for decades. 
 Consider the dissent of Justice Byron White in Rakas v. Illinois.272 
The case concerned the issue of who had standing to raise Fourth 
Amendment violations—specifically, whether passengers in a car 
that was illegally searched had standing to raise the issue of the ille-
gal search even though they did not own the car.273 If they had stand-
ing, then the evidence would be suppressed under the exclusionary 
rule; if not, the evidence would not be suppressed despite the illegal-
ity.274 The Court held that passengers had no standing.275 Justice 
White, in dissent, commented, 
[T]he ruling today undercuts the force of the exclusionary rule in 
the one area in which its use is most certainly justified—the deter-
rence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment. This deci-
sion invites police to engage in patently unreasonable searches 
every time an automobile contains more than one occupant. . . .  
 Of course, most police officers will decline the Court’s invitation 
and will continue to do their jobs as best they can in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment. But the very purpose of the Bill of Rights 
was to answer the justified fear that governmental agents cannot 
be left totally to their own devices, and the Bill of Rights is en-
forceable in the courts because human experience teaches that not 
all such officials will otherwise adhere to the stated precepts. . . . 
In the rush to limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
somewhere, anywhere, the Court ignores precedent, logic and 
 
 270. Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Madhavi M. McCall, Criminal Justice 
and the 2005-2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 495 (1997); 
see JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007). 
 271. See sources cited supra note 270. 
 272. 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in this 
dissent by Justice Stevens, the only current member of the Court who participated in the 
Rakas decision. Id. 
 273. Id. at 129-30 (majority opinion). 
 274. See id. at 133-34. 
 275. Id. at 128.  
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common sense to exclude the rule’s operation from situations in 
which, paradoxically, it is justified and needed.276
Justice White cautioned that “some deterrent is needed” because 
“[s]ome policemen simply do act in bad faith, even if for understand-
able ends.”277 Justice White concluded that, “[a]fter this decision, po-
lice will have little to lose by unreasonably searching.”278 These 
words apply with equal force to the decision in Hudson. 
 The trend to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule accelerated in 
the mid-1980s, with the Court creating two new exceptions to the 
rule: the “good-faith” exception279 and the “inevitable discovery” ex-
ception,280 causing Justice Brennan to bemoan the Court’s “zealous 
efforts to emasculate the exclusionary rule”281 and “the Court’s grad-
ual but determined strangulation of the rule.”282 Dissenting in Leon, 
Justice Stevens expressed concern about the incentives the Court 
was creating for the police:  
 Today’s decisions do grave damage to that deterrent function 
[served by the exclusionary rule]. . . .  
 . . . The Court’s approach—which, in effect, encourages the 
police to seek a warrant even if they know the existence of 
probable cause is doubtful—can only lead to an increased num-
ber of constitutional violations.283
 The trend to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule was furthered 
with the appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court in 1986. A review 
of leading cases since that year reveals that he and his conservative 
brethren consistently discount the potential for police abuses. For 
example, serious concerns about police incentives to violate the 
Fourth Amendment were expressed in the 1988 case of Murray v. 
United States.284 In Murray, the police had unlawfully searched a 
private warehouse without a warrant and observed contraband 
(bales of marijuana).285 The police then sought and received a war-
rant to search the warehouse, not mentioning in the warrant applica-
tion that they had already been inside and observed the drugs.286 The 
issue was whether the evidence seized during the search pursuant to 
the warrant should be suppressed because of the prior illegal en-
 
 276. Id. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984). 
 280. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 281. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 282. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 283. Id. at 973-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 284. 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
 285. Id. at 533. 
 286. Id.  
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try.287 The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Scalia, held that 
the taint of the illegal search was erased by the subsequent lawful 
search; thus, the drugs, although found initially during an illegal 
search, were admissible because they were seized pursuant to a law-
ful “independent source.”288 The dissent, written by Justice Marshall 
and joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, expressed grave con-
cern over the incentives the new “independent source” exception to 
the exclusionary rule would create for the police:  
[A]dmission of the evidence “reseized” during the second search 
severely undermines the deterrence function of the exclusionary 
rule. Indeed, admission in these cases affirmatively encourages il-
legal searches. The incentives for such illegal conduct are clear. 
Obtaining a warrant is inconvenient and time consuming. Even 
when officers have probable cause to support a warrant applica-
tion, therefore, they have an incentive first to determine whether 
it is worthwhile to obtain a warrant. Probable cause is much less 
than certainty, and many “confirmatory” searches will result in the 
discovery that no evidence is present, thus saving the police the 
time and trouble of getting a warrant. If contraband is discovered, 
however, the officers may later seek a warrant to shield the evi-
dence from the taint of the illegal search. The police thus know in ad-
vance that they have little to lose and much to gain by forgoing the 
bother of obtaining a warrant and undertaking an illegal search.289
 Justice Scalia dismissed this concern: 
We see the incentives differently. An officer with probable cause 
sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish to enter the 
premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk 
suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen, 
since his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a 
magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous 
burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained from 
the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers’ deci-
sion to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s decision to grant it.290
Justice Scalia did not consider the possibility that the police would 
simply neglect to mention the first illegal search to the magistrate or 
in their police report, so the defense would not have the information 
on which to raise a suppression motion with the trial court. But if the of-
ficers were unethical enough to engage in a search without a warrant, 
why would he expect them to be honest about their illegal behavior? 
 Two years later, in Alabama v. White, the conservative majority 
(including Justices Scalia and Thomas) found that an anonymous tip 
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 290. Id. at 540 (majority opinion).  
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was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry 
stop.291 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
argued in dissent that the ruling gave the police incentive to fabri-
cate anonymous tips:  
[U]nder the Court’s holding, every citizen is subject to being seized 
and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the 
warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting what-
ever conduct the officer just observed. Fortunately, the vast major-
ity of those in our law enforcement community would not adopt 
such a practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to pro-
tect the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as 
well as from those who are conscientious and truthful. This deci-
sion makes a mockery of that protection.292
 The following year, in California v. Hodari D., the Court consid-
ered the issue of what constituted a seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.293 Hodari D. had fled on foot when he saw 
the police approaching.294 The police instructed him to stop and be-
gan pursuing him.295 During the pursuit, Hodari D. abandoned some 
drugs, which the police recovered.296 Hodari D. argued that he had 
been seized at the moment the police pursued him and instructed 
him to stop (even though he did not obey the instruction) and that 
this seizure was illegal, as it was not based on probable cause.297 If 
the Court agreed that he had been seized, the evidence that Hodari 
D. had dropped while fleeing from the police would have been subject 
to suppression under the exclusionary rule,298 but the Court did not 
rule this way. Rather, the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia 
and joined by Justices Souter and Kennedy, held that a “show of au-
thority” alone was not a seizure, and therefore the police officers’ ac-
tion in instructing Hodari D. to stop and chasing him were not sub-
ject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.299 
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, raised concerns about the 
incentives for abuse that this would create for police:   
In an airport setting, may a drug enforcement agent now approach 
a group of passengers with his gun drawn, announce a “baggage 
search,” and rely on the passengers’ reactions to justify his investi-
gative stops? The holding of today’s majority fails to recognize the 
 
 291. 496 U.S. 325, 326-27 (1990). For a discussion of the implication of Hudson in the 
Terry stop context, see Part V.C. 
 292. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 293. 499 U.S. 621, 623 (1991). 
 294. Id. at 622-23. 
 295. Id. at 623, 626. 
 296. Id. at 623. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 623-24. 
 299. Id. at 629. 
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coercive and intimidating nature of such behavior and creates a 
rule that may allow such behavior to go unchecked. 
     . . . . 
 It is too early to know the consequences of the Court’s holding. 
If carried to its logical conclusion, it will encourage unlawful dis-
plays of force that will frighten countless innocent citizens into 
surrendering whatever privacy rights they may still have. . . . To-
day’s qualification of the Fourth Amendment means that innocent 
citizens may remain “secure in their persons . . . against unreason-
able searches and seizures” only at the discretion of the police.300  
 More recently, in United States v. Patane, the Court had to “decide 
whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by 
Miranda v. Arizona requires suppression of the physical fruits of the 
suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.”301 The Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, held that suppression was not required.302 The dissenters, 
in an opinion by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg, again expressed concern about the incentives this would pro-
vide for the police to violate citizens’ constitutional rights:  
The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive 
for the police to omit Miranda warnings, before custodial interro-
gation. In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evi-
dentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda, the plurality 
adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule 
in that case.  
 . . . . 
 There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invi-
tation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there 
may be physical evidence to be gained.303
B.   A Trio of Cases: Leading Cases Cited by the Majority in Hudson 
v. Michigan 
 Hudson is consistent with the trend of the conservative wing of 
the Court in recent years to minimize the impact and applicability of 
the exclusionary rule and to discount police incentives to violate the 
Constitution. But is Hudson consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent or is it true, as Justice Breyer states, that the opinion “repre-
sents a significant departure from the Court’s precedents”?304 In Sec-
tion IV of his opinion, Justice Scalia attempts to demonstrate that 
 
 300. Id. at 645-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 301. 542 U.S. 630, 633-34 (2004) (citation omitted).  
 302. Id. at 633.  
 303. Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 304. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2171 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
704  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:659 
 
                                                                                                                   
his opinion is consistent with the prior precedents of the Court.305 Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, “[a] trio of cases—Segura v. United States, 
New York v. Harris, and United States v. Ramirez—confirms our con-
clusion that suppression is unwarranted in this case.”306 Let us con-
sider each of these cases.  
C.   Segura v. United States Does Not Support Hudson 
 The facts of Segura are complex and unique. Acting on informa-
tion that Segura and his associate Colon were trafficking in cocaine 
from their apartment, New York Drug Enforcement Task Force 
agents placed them under surveillance.307 They observed Colon de-
liver a bulky package to Ms. Parra at a restaurant parking lot while 
petitioner Segura and Mr. Rivudalla-Vidal visited inside the restau-
rant.308 The agents followed Parra and Rivudalla-Vidal to their 
apartment and stopped them.309 Parra was found in possession of co-
caine, and she and Rivudalla-Vidal were immediately arrested.310 Af-
ter being advised of his constitutional rights, Rivudalla-Vidal admit-
ted that he had purchased the cocaine from Segura and confirmed 
that Colon had made the delivery at the restaurant.311 Task Force 
agents were then authorized by an Assistant United States Attorney 
to arrest petitioners and were advised that since a search warrant for 
petitioners’ apartment probably could not be obtained until the fol-
lowing day, the agents should secure the premises to prevent de-
struction of evidence.312 Later that same evening, the agents arrested 
petitioner Segura in the lobby of his apartment building, took him to 
the apartment, knocked on the door, and, when it was opened by Co-
lon, entered the apartment without requesting or receiving permis-
sion.313 The agents conducted a limited security check of the apart-
ment and observed various drug paraphernalia in plain view.314 Co-
lon was then arrested, and both Colon and Segura were taken into 
custody.315 Two agents remained in the apartment awaiting the war-
rant, but because of administrative delay the search warrant was not 
issued until some nineteen hours after the initial entry.316 In the 
search pursuant to the warrant, the agents discovered cocaine and 
 
 305. Id. at 2168-70 (majority opinion). 
 306. Id. at 2168 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998); New York v. Harris, 
495 U.S. 14 (1990); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).  
 307. Segura, 468 U.S. at 799. 
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records of narcotics transactions.317 These items were seized together 
with those items observed during the security check.318
 The district court granted petitioners’ pretrial motion to suppress 
all the seized evidence.319 The court of appeals held that the evidence 
discovered in plain view on the initial entry should be suppressed, 
but not the evidence seized during the warrant search.320 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling.321 The majority 
opinion was, in the words of its author, Chief Justice Burger, 
“carefully limited”:322
Specifically, we hold that where officers, having probable cause, 
enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants who 
have legitimate possessory interests in its contents and take them 
into custody and, for no more than the period here involved, secure 
the premises from within to preserve the status quo while oth-
ers, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant, 
they do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription 
against unreasonable seizures.323
 Thus, Segura can be readily distinguished from Hudson. First, 
evidence was suppressed in Segura as a result of the illegal entry 
into the home.324 All drug paraphernalia evidence the police observed 
in plain view during their protective sweep of the apartment was 
suppressed.325 By applying the exclusionary rule to the fruits of the 
unlawful entry,326 the Court kept in place a significant deterrent for 
police to enter homes without warrants. What the Court did not ex-
clude was evidence that was found pursuant to a lawful, warranted 
search the following day.327 It was not alleged that the search that 
yielded the additional evidence was conducted in an unreasonable 
manner. Thus, the issue in Hudson, the manner of execution of a 
warrant,328 was neither raised nor considered in Segura. Justice 
Scalia’s comparison of the two cases—“[l]ike today’s case, Segura in-
volved a concededly illegal entry”329—is inapt. After Segura, one 
could still say that the police must have a valid search warrant and 
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 322. Id. at 798.  
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must execute it in compliance with the Fourth Amendment in order 
to introduce evidence found in the search.330
D.   New York v. Harris Does Not Support Hudson 
 Justice Scalia’s reliance on New York v. Harris331 is similarly mis-
placed. In Harris, the police entered petitioner’s home to arrest 
him.332 While they had probable cause, they had not obtained a war-
rant, in violation of Payton v. New York.333 Harris was advised of his 
rights under Miranda while inside his home and made an incrimi-
nating statement.334 He was then taken to the police station where 
he was again advised of his Miranda rights and made another in-
criminating statement.335 The issue before the Court was whether 
the second confession, made at the stationhouse after a re-advisement 
of rights, was so tainted by the initial illegal entry into Harris’ home 
that it must be excluded as well as the first statement.336 The Court 
held: 
[T]he station house statement in this case was admissible be-
cause Harris was in legal custody . . . and because the statement, 
while the product of an arrest and being in custody, was not the 
fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather 
than someplace else.337
 As in Segura, the Harris Court did not question the propriety of 
suppressing evidence acquired in the home as a result of an illegal 
entry. The message to the police was that if they entered a home 
without a warrant, any evidence obtained therein (in this case, in-
criminating statements) would be suppressed and even the reading 
of Miranda rights would not dissipate the taint of the illegal entry.338 
Similarly, any spontaneous statements Harris might have made 
would have been suppressed along with any physical evidence found 
in the home during the illegal arrest, including evidence from a 
 
 330. Justice Stevens, in dissent, still worried about the incentives for abuse that the 
Segura decision was creating:  
The Court’s disposition, I fear, will provide government agents with an affirma-
tive incentive to engage in unconstitutional violations of the privacy of the 
home. The Court’s disposition is, therefore, inconsistent with a primary pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule—to ensure that all private 
citizens—not just these petitioners—have some meaningful protection against 
future violations of their rights.  
Segura, 468 U.S. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 331. 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
 332. Id. at 15-16. 
 333. Id. at 16 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). 
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search of his person and the area under his immediate control,339 evi-
dence found during a protective sweep of the home,340 and any other 
evidence found in plain view.341 Indeed, if Harris had remained silent 
while in police custody on the way to the stationhouse, the police 
would not have had any usable confession and conviction would have 
been problematic. Thus, although Harris may have diluted the deter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule to enter a home to make an arrest 
without a warrant, it did not eliminate it.342
 A careful reading of Segura and Harris reveals that they do not 
support the Hudson decision. The four dissenters rejected Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning: “It should be apparent by now that the three 
cases upon which Justice Scalia relies—Segura v. United States; New 
York v. Harris; and Ramirez—do not support his conclusion.”343 And 
Justice Kennedy specifically disagreed with Part IV of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion, stating, “I am not convinced that Segura v. United 
States and New York v. Harris have as much relevance here as Jus-
tice Scalia appears to conclude.”344  
E.   United States v. Ramirez Does Not Support Hudson 
 The final case Justice Scalia cites in support of his position in 
Hudson is United States v. Ramirez.345 At first glance, Ramirez does ap-
pear to support his argument. Justice Breyer refers to Ramirez as “of-
fer[ing] the majority its last best hope.”346 According to Justice Scalia, 
 United States v. Ramirez involved a claim that police entry vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment because it was effected by breaking a 
window. We ultimately concluded that the property destruction 
was, under all the circumstances, reasonable, but in the course of 
our discussion we unanimously said the following: “[D]estruction of 
property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the 
search are not subject to suppression.” Had the breaking of the 
window been unreasonable, the Court said, it would have been 
necessary to determine whether there had been a “sufficient causal 
relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery 
of the guns to warrant suppression of the evidence.” What clearer 
 
 339. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 340. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 
 341. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 
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 342. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Ste-
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ruling creates for knowing and intentional constitutional violations by the police.” Harris, 
495 U.S. at 21-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 343. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2183 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
 344. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 345. Id. at 2170 (majority opinion); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
 346. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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expression could there be of the proposition that an impermissible 
manner of entry does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule?347
 In order to understand the context of the quotations taken from 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, the facts of Ramirez must be con-
sidered. A Deputy U.S. Marshal sought and received a “no-knock” 
warrant granting permission to enter and search Ramirez’s home for 
Alan Shelby, an escaped convict who was believed to be hiding 
there.348 Before executing the search warrant, the officers were in-
formed by a reliable confidential informant that Ramirez “might 
have a stash of guns and drugs hidden in his garage.”349 However, 
they did not seek a warrant to search for these items at the time as they 
were focused on capturing Shelby.350 After receipt of the search warrant, 
law enforcement officers proceeded to Ramirez’s home, where 
[i]n the early morning of November 5, approximately 45 officers 
gathered to execute the warrant. The officers set up a portable 
loud speaker system and began announcing that they had a search 
warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in the ga-
rage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to 
dissuade any of the occupants from rushing to the weapons the of-
ficers believed might be in the garage.  
 Respondent and his family were asleep inside the house at the 
time this activity began. Awakened by the noise, respondent be-
lieved that they were being burglarized. He ran to his utility 
closet, grabbed a pistol, and fired it into the ceiling of his garage. 
The officers fired back and shouted “police.” At that point respon-
dent realized that it was law enforcement officers who were trying 
to enter his home. He ran to the living room, threw his pistol away, 
and threw himself onto the floor. Shortly thereafter, he, his wife, 
and their child left the house and were taken into police custody. 
Respondent waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted that he 
had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another 
gun that was inside the house, and that he was a convicted felon. 
Officers soon obtained another search warrant, which they used to 
return to the house and retrieve the two guns.351  
 Ramirez argued that breaking his garage window was unreason-
able.352 The Supreme Court rejected this contention.353 The police had 
obtained a no-knock warrant and had, in fact, announced their pres-
ence over a loudspeaker.354 They did not gain entry through the bro-
 
 347. Id. at 2170 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 
72 n.3 (1998). 
 348. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 68. 
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 354. Id. at 68-69. 
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ken window in the garage.355 Furthermore, the police did not enter 
the home until they heard a gunshot within.356 After a fully Miran-
dized confession in which Ramirez admitted to possessing firearms, 
the police sought a search warrant specifically to search for the 
guns.357 Despite these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that knock-and-
announce was violated and the seizure of the guns was a direct result 
of the unreasonable conduct of the police.358 Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
in response to this, inserted this footnote in his opinion: 
After concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated in 
this case, the Ninth Circuit further concluded that the guns should 
be excluded from evidence. Because we conclude that there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide whether, for ex-
ample, there was sufficient causal relationship between the break-
ing of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant sup-
pression of the evidence.359
 By alluding in his footnote to the leading cases for the inevitable 
discovery and attenuation exceptions to the exclusionary rule, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist seems merely to be saying that before excluding 
evidence, the Court must determine if any exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule apply.360 Under the facts of Ramirez, a plausible argu-
ment could be made that Ramirez’ intervening act of firing the gun 
broke the chain of causation.361 Furthermore, his voluntary confes-
sion and the subsequent search with a second search warrant argua-
bly attenuated the taint of any illegality on the part of the officers.362 
It may also be suggested that the police would have inevitably dis-
covered the firearms because they would have sought a search war-
rant based on the reliable confidential informant’s tip that Ramirez 
had guns and drugs.363  
 In short, although Chief Justice Rehnquist did indicate that un-
reasonably breaking a window during the execution of a search war-
rant would not necessarily lead to suppression of evidence,364 he did 
not state that “an impermissible manner of entry does not necessar-
 
 355. Id. at 69. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 69-70. 
 359. Id. at 72 n.3 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
 360. See id. 
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sion United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1307 (1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), where 
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 363. See id. at 68-69. 
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ily trigger the exclusionary rule.”365 The alleged unnecessary destruc-
tion of property in Ramirez was a single pane of glass in a garage 
door.366 The police did not “enter” through the broken window, but 
rather one officer pointed a gun through the broken garage window 
while others entered the home.367 All that the Ramirez dicta really 
stands for is that the unreasonable breaking of a window by police 
will not necessarily lead to suppression, an unremarkable proposi-
tion.368 Even the most ardent supporter of the exclusionary rule 
would be hesitant to suppress evidence merely because the police 
gratuitously broke a window on the way in the house.  
 In short, none of the primary trio of cases cited by the majority of-
fer any compelling support for their decision.  
F.   Established Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule 
 Prior to Hudson, there were four established exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule: attenuation,369 independent source,370 inevitable dis-
covery,371 and good-faith.372 The first three exceptions are generally 
considered to be related and are collectively referred to as the “fruit 
of the poisonous tree,” or “derivative evidence,” doctrine. Justice 
Scalia drew heavily on the derivative evidence doctrine in his opin-
ion, particularly the attenuation and inevitable discovery excep-
tions;373 his reliance on this doctrine was misplaced.  
 The attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule was first ex-
pressed in Nardone v. United States374 and was more fully developed 
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relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant 
suppression of the evidence.” Id. This would be an example where “unnecessary destruc-
tion of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though 
the entry itself is lawful.” Id. at 71. 
 369. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 
U.S. 338 (1939). 
 370. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 371. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 421 (1984). 
 372. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The majority does not rely on this ex-
ception in Hudson, but does cite Leon twice in support of its “social costs” argument and as 
proof that the Court does not reflexively apply the exclusionary rule. Hudson v. Michigan, 
126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165-66 (2006). 
 373. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2179-80. 
 374. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
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in Wong Sun v. United States.375 In Wong Sun, the defendant was the 
subject of an unconstitutional arrest.376 Several days after the arrest, 
he voluntarily returned to the police station and made an inculpatory 
statement.377 The Court cited both the passage of time (“temporal 
proximity”) and the voluntary act (“free will”) of the defendant in de-
termining that the statement had “become so attenuated as to dissi-
pate the taint.”378  In determining whether the attenuation exception 
applies, courts must determine “whether, granting establishment of 
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”379
 The independent source exception to the exclusionary rule was 
first set forth in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States380 and 
more fully developed in Murray v. United States.381 In Murray, the 
police violated the Fourth Amendment by entering a warehouse 
without a search warrant; inside, they discovered bales of mari-
juana.382 The police then left the warehouse and obtained a search 
warrant for the warehouse.383 The warrant was based on probable 
cause that the police had obtained lawfully prior to entering the 
warehouse.384 The Court remanded the case to the lower court to de-
termine if “the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an 
independent source of the challenged evidence,” with a plurality of 
the Court strongly suggesting that it should be.385  The independent 
source doctrine is designed to put  
the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have 
been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When the 
challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such 
evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would 
have been in absent any error or violation.386  
The inevitable discovery exception was created in Nix v. Wil-
liams.387 In Nix, the police found the body of a victim after the mur-
 
 375. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 376. Id. at 479, 490. 
 377. Id. at 476-77. 
 378. Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). 
 379. Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1982)). 
 380. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 381. 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
 382. Id. at 535.  
 383. Id. at 535-36. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 543-44. 
 386. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (citations omitted). One is tempted to 
ask why should not the police be placed in a worse position because they violated the law? 
Are not the rest of us placed in a worse position when we violate the law?  
 387. Id. at 444. 
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der suspect, Williams, informed them of its location.388 Although the 
Court acknowledged that the police had obtained the information 
from Williams in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
and that his statement was thus inadmissible, the Court neverthe-
less admitted the evidence relating to the victim’s body.389 Although 
the body was a “fruit” of the statement, the Court held that the body 
would have been discovered within a short time even without Wil-
liams’ cooperation because there was a search team already search-
ing the area prior to his disclosure of the body’s location.390 The inevi-
table discovery exception created a sort of hypothetical independent 
source doctrine based on the same rationale as independent source: 
“[E]xclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered 
would also put the government in a worse position, because the police 
would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken place.”391
G.   Application of the Derivative Evidence Doctrine in Hudson: 
Attenuation 
 There was no evidence of an act of free will or the passage of any 
appreciable period of time between the “primary illegality” in Hud-
son and the discovery of the evidence. The rocks of cocaine sought to 
be suppressed by the petitioner were discovered within a few seconds 
of the illegal entry.392 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia applies the con-
cept of attenuation, citing Wong Sun.393 He suggests that attenuation 
can occur not only “when the causal connection is remote” but also 
“when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected 
by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be 
served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”394 Justice Scalia 
cites New York v. Harris395 as an example of application of this 
meaning of attenuation, disregarding the fact that the Court in 
Harris had explicitly declined to apply the attenuation doctrine in 
that case by stating,  
[A]ttenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold 
matter, courts determine that “the challenged evidence is in some 
sense the product of illegal governmental activity.” . . . 
 Harris’ statement taken at the police station was not the prod-
uct of being in unlawful custody. Neither was it the fruit of having 
been arrested in the home rather than someplace else. The case is 
 
 388. Id. at 436. 
 389. Id. at 432. 
 390. Id. at 449-50. 
 391. Id. at 444. 
 392. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006). 
 393. Id. at 2164. 
 394. Id. 
 395. 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
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analogous to United States v. Crews. In that case, we refused to 
suppress a victim’s in-court identification despite the defendant’s 
illegal arrest. The Court found that the evidence was not “ ‘come at 
by exploitation’ of . . . the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights,” 
and that it was not necessary to inquire whether the “taint” of the 
Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit 
the introduction of the evidence. Here, likewise, the police had a 
justification to question Harris prior to his arrest; therefore, his 
subsequent statement was not an exploitation of the illegal entry 
into Harris’ home.396
 Justice Scalia concluded that the evidence seized in Hudson was 
attenuated “[s]ince the interests that were violated in this case have 
nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence.”397 Although Justice 
Kennedy distanced himself from Justice Scalia’s dubious invocation 
of New York v. Harris, he nevertheless ultimately endorses his view 
of attenuation.398 According to Justice Kennedy, “[u]nder our prece-
dents the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce 
requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppres-
sion.”399 Thus, under the majority’s logic, attenuation can occur in-
stantly. According to Justice Scalia, the moment the constitutional 
violation ended and the police stepped inside the home to begin their 
lawful search, the taint of the failure to properly knock-and-
announce was dissipated.400 This instant attenuation concept is a clear 
deviation from prior precedent.401 Justice Breyer correctly states that 
“the majority gives the word ‘attenuation’ a new meaning.”402  
H.   Application of Derivative Evidence Doctrine in Hudson: 
Inevitable Discovery 
 The Michigan Supreme Court relied exclusively on the inevitable 
discovery exception in deciding that the exclusionary rule should not 
be applied to knock-and-announce violations in People v. Stevens:  
 Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, 
allowing the evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better 
position than it would be in had the police adhered to the knock-
and-announce requirement. However, excluding the evidence puts 
the prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had 
there been no police misconduct. Therefore, the inevitable discov-
 
 396. Id. at 19 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 397. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. 
 398. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I am not convinced that . . . New York v. 
Harris ha[s] as much relevance here as Justice Scalia appears to conclude . . . .”). 
 399. Id. at 2170-71. 
 400. Id. at 2179-80.  
 401. See supra note 378.  
 402. Id. at 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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ery exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the 
prosecution in the present case.403
 Professor LaFave has called the People v. Stevens decision an “ab-
surdity” and an “Alice-in-Wonderland version of inevitable discov-
ery.”404 Perhaps that is one reason the Hudson majority opinion, al-
though affirming the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision not to apply 
the exclusionary rule, never once mentions the term “inevitable dis-
covery” nor cites People v. Stevens, Silverthorne, or Nix. But while 
not explicitly using the phrase, the majority uses the description of 
inevitable discovery: “Whether that preliminary misstep had oc-
curred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had 
obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the 
house.”405 This is a misapplication of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine.406 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent: 
The Court nonetheless accepts Michigan’s argument that the req-
uisite but-for-causation is not satisfied in this case . . . . As sup-
port for this proposition, Michigan rests on this Court’s inevitable 
discovery cases. 
 This claim, however, misunderstands the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. Justice Holmes in Silverthorne, in discussing an “inde-
pendent source” exception, set forth the principles underlying the 
inevitable discovery rule. That rule does not refer to discovery that 
would have taken place if the police behavior in question had (con-
trary to fact) been lawful. The doctrine does not treat as critical 
what hypothetically could have happened had the police acted law-
fully in the first place. Rather, “independent” or “inevitable” dis-
covery refers to discovery that did occur or that would have oc-
curred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful be-
havior and (2) independently of that unlawful behavior.407
 
 403. 597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (1999). For a useful critique of People v. Stevens, see Robin L. 
Gentry, Note, Why Knock? The Door Will Inevitably Open: An Analysis of People v. Stevens 
and the Michigan Supreme Court’s Departure from Fourth Amendment Protection, 46 
WAYNE L. REV. 1659 (2000). See generally Jenny Dobrovolec, Note, People v. Stevens: The 
Michigan Supreme Court Applies the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
When Officers Violate the Knock and Announce Statute, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 569 (2001).  
 404. 6 LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 274-73.  
 405. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164. 
 406. For contrasting perspectives on the appropriateness of applying inevitable discov-
ery to knock-and-announce violations, see Estrada, supra note 254; Mattias Luukkonen, 
Knock, Knock. What’s Inevitably There? An Analysis of the Applicability of the Doctrine of 
Inevitable Discovery to Knock and Announce Violations, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 153 (2004); 
and Randall S. Bethune, Note and Comment: The Exclusionary Rule and the Knock-and-
Announce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for Otherwise Reasonable Search Warrant Exe-
cution, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 879 (2001). 
 407. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Silverthorne Lumber 
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). 
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V.   THE SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF HUDSON 
A.   The New Parallel Universe Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
 Despite the majority’s efforts to shoehorn the knock-and-announce 
exception into existing precedent, Hudson does not fit into any of the 
established exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Rather, by relying on 
not what did happen, but what could have happened, Hudson in ef-
fect creates a whole new exception—what might be called the paral-
lel universe exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this exception, 
courts must ask the following question: if the same officers had con-
ducted the same search, but doing only what they were authorized to 
do under the Constitution, would they have found the same evi-
dence? If the answer is “yes,” the evidence will be deemed admissible. 
Therefore, if the officers in Hudson had simply conducted a lawful 
search (with no knock-and-announce violation), as they were author-
ized by warrant to do, they would have found the same evidence. Jus-
tice Scalia has thus created a fictional parallel universe408 in which 
the police always act in good faith. In the real world, the police may 
violate the Constitution with impunity without fear of having evidence 
suppressed (so long as they do so in ways which do not enhance their 
chances of finding evidence) because they can rely on their hypothetical 
doppelgangers in the parallel universe to behave themselves.409  
B.   The Dimensions of the Parallel Universe Exception 
 The parallel universe exception could potentially exempt a variety 
of unconstitutional police behaviors from the reach of the exclusion-
ary rule. First, it seems clear that any violations in the manner of 
execution of a warrant would be subject to this exception. So long as 
the warrant itself is valid, the officers may engage in wholesale de-
struction of private property, both inside and outside the home, be-
cause the good parallel universe cops would have found the exact 
same evidence without damaging the property at all. Similarly, the 
timing of the execution of the search warrant could become largely 
irrelevant. Officers intent on frightening or embarrassing the occu-
pants of a home could execute a daytime warrant at nighttime, know-
ing that their imaginary counterparts would wait until the morning 
 
 408. For a nonscientists’ guide to the quantum physics-based cosmological theory of 
parallel universes, see generally M.R. FRANKS, THE UNIVERSE AND MULTIPLE REALITY 
(2003) and Max Tegmark, Parallel Universes, SCI. AM., May 2003, at 41.  
 409. Once again, Justice Scalia owes an unacknowledged ideological debt to Judge 
Posner for the parallel universe concept, which Judge Posner introduced in United States 
v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999). See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text. 
In Stefonek, Chief Judge Posner admitted evidence seized pursuant to a patently defective 
warrant because “[t]he search would thus have been identical in scope, and exactly the 
same evidence would have been seized, had the warrant complied with the Constitution.” 
Id. at 1034.  
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and seize the same incriminating items.410 Even a stale warrant 
could conceivably be revived in the parallel universe. The Court long 
ago suggested that the Fourth Amendment prohibits excessive delay 
in execution of a warrant even if no time constraints are imposed by 
statute or the warrant itself.411 The court recently reaffirmed this 
view:  
[P]robable cause may cease to exist after a warrant is issued. . . . 
[T]he probable-cause showing may have grown “stale” in view of 
the time that has passed since the warrant was issued. (“[T]he 
facts in an affidavit supporting a search warrant must be suffi-
ciently close in time to the issuance of the warrant and the sub-
sequent search conducted so that probable cause can be said to 
exist as of the time of the search and not simply as of some time 
in the past.”).412  
 Consider this hypothetical. Suppose the police apply for a warrant 
to search a home. The application for the warrant provides probable 
cause to believe that a crate of illegal arms was recently delivered to 
a suspect’s home, and the police have reliable information that the 
 
 410. The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that nighttime searches are governed 
by a higher standard than daytime searches, but Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by 
Justices Douglas and Brennan, expressed the view that nighttime searches should require 
more than standard probable cause:  
 This Court has consistently recognized that the intrusion upon privacy en-
gendered by a search of a residence at night is of an order of magnitude greater 
than that produced by an ordinary search. . . . “[I]t is difficult to imagine a 
more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private 
home.” . . . And our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 
was in large part based upon our revulsion at the thought of nighttime searches 
of the marital bedroom to discover evidence of illegal contraceptive use.  
   . . . .    
 . . . As even the Government in this case concedes, “searches conducted in the 
middle of the night . . . involve a greater intrusion than ordinary searches and 
therefore require a greater justification.” In my view, this principle may well be 
a constitutional imperative.  
Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal cita-
tions omitted).  
 Justice Marshall also noted that “most of the States’ laws provide that search warrants 
may only be served during the day unless express authorization for a nighttime search is 
obtained, and such authorization can generally be obtained only by meeting special re-
quirements for a nighttime search.” Id. at 464 n.1. The Supreme Court has not revisited 
this issue in the past thirty-two years, but numerous lower courts have. See generally 
Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of Execution of a Search Warrant at Nighttime, 
41 A.L.R. 5TH 171 (1996). At the reargument in Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Souter sug-
gested that a nighttime search could violate the Fourth Amendment: “[N]ighttime searches 
when only a daytime search is authorized amounts to an unreasonable search.” Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 57-58, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (No. 04-1360), 2006 
WL 1522979; see United States v. Hurn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42768 (W.D. Wis. 2006) 
(denying motion to suppress based on nighttime execution of warrant and citing Hudson). 
 411. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1932). 
 412. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1499 n.2 (2006) (quoting United States 
v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
2007]                         FRUITLESS POISONOUS TREES 717 
 
                                                                                                                   
shipment will be moved to another location in eight days. The magis-
trate issues the warrant. The investigating officers then go on vaca-
tion for a week. On the ninth day, the officers decide to execute the 
warrant even though they believe that the contraband was moved 
the day before. There is a strong argument that the officer’s decision 
is unconstitutional because, at the time the warrant is executed, 
there is no probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure will 
be found. But the officers are lucky, and they find the guns; the crate 
has not been moved as they believed it had been. Was the entire 
search improper because the warrant was no longer valid or was it 
merely the manner of execution of the warrant (the timing) that was 
improper? According to the Hudson Court, a knock-and-announce 
violation is just a matter of arriving a few seconds early, so what is 
the difference if the timing is a few hours late? In the parallel uni-
verse, the hypothetical good cops would have arrived exactly on time 
and would have found the exact same crate of guns. Being late did 
not “cause” the police to find the evidence, so the evidence should not 
be suppressed. 
C.   Application of the Parallel Universe Exception to Terry Stops 
 The parallel universe exception is not logically limited to searches 
of homes. It could, for example, apply to searches of persons con-
ducted under Terry v. Ohio.413  Suppose an officer has reasonable 
suspicion that a young woman is planning to rob a store and that she 
is armed. He is thus authorized, under Terry, to stop and frisk her.414 
The officer asks the young woman to turn around and put her hands 
on the wall, then proceeds to fondle and squeeze her entire body, pay-
ing special emphasis to her private parts, as he searches her from 
head to toe. The officer finds a gun stuck in the top of the suspect’s 
sock under her trousers. Similarly, suppose an officer (again, with 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed) throws a suspect to the 
ground, wrenches his arm up behind his back, and grinds his face 
into the sidewalk while his partner searches him, finding a gun 
tucked in the suspect’s waistband. Clearly, in both cases, the officers’ 
actions were unreasonable and exceeded the scope of an authorized 
pat-down. But, in both cases, the officers were authorized to do a 
Terry frisk, and had they patted down the suspects properly, they 
would have found the weapons. Again, under the logic of Hudson, 
there would be no reason to exclude the evidence. 
 There are cases which suggest that exceeding the scope of a Terry 
frisk will result in the application of the exclusionary rule, but a close 
reading of the cases reveals that these cases can be distinguished 
 
 413. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 414. Id. at 27. 
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from the preceding examples. Consider, for example, Sibron v. 
New York,415 which involved a motion to suppress drugs found in 
Sibron’s pocket:  
[A]ssuming arguendo that there were adequate grounds to search 
Sibron for weapons, the nature and scope of the search conducted 
by Patrolman Martin were so clearly unrelated to that justification 
as to render the heroin inadmissible. The search for weapons ap-
proved in Terry consisted solely of a limited patting of the outer 
clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used 
as instruments of assault. Only when he discovered such objects 
did the officer in Terry place his hands in the pockets of the men 
he searched. In this case, with no attempt at an initial limited ex-
ploration for arms, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into Sibron’s 
pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin. His testimony 
shows that he was looking for narcotics, and he found them.416
Sibron is different than the hypotheticals because Patrolman Martin 
essentially skipped the frisk and reached straight into Sibron’s 
pocket.417 Thus, Patrolman Martin conducted a completely unauthor-
ized search as opposed to conducting an authorized search in an un-
authorized manner. If the hypothetically good Patrolman Martin had 
conducted the pat-down of Sibron, he would not have found a weapon 
(or anything that would have justified a more intrusive search).  
 The Court addressed another improper Terry search in Minnesota 
v. Dickerson.418 The evidence sought to be suppressed in Dickerson 
was a lump of cocaine found in the suspect’s pocket:  
[T]he officer determined that the lump was contraband only after 
“squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the 
defendant’s pocket”—a pocket which the officer already knew con-
tained no weapon.  
 . . . [T]he police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the 
“strictly circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under Terry. . . . 
Here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket af-
ter having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to 
“[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry:] . . . the protec-
tion of the police officer and others nearby.” It therefore 
amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly 
refused to authorize . . . .419
 As in Sibron, the Court suppressed the cocaine.420 Also like Si-
bron, had the officer conducted a proper Terry search, he would not 
 
 415. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 416. Id. at 65. 
 417. Id. 
 418. 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
 419. Id. at 378 (citations omitted). 
 420. Id. at 366. 
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have reached into Dickerson’s pocket and found drugs. Because the 
hypothetical good cop would not have discovered any evidence at all, 
it would be consistent with Hudson to apply the exclusionary rule in 
this case while still leaving room to decline to apply it in the hypo-
thetical situations posed above.  
D.   A Bad-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
 As these examples demonstrate, what is fundamentally different 
about the parallel universe exception from the established exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule is that it is a true “bad-faith” exception.421 At 
the time the police are faced with the choice of acting reasonably and 
following the Constitution or acting unreasonably and intentionally 
violating the Constitution, they can choose the latter course knowing 
that there is no chance that any evidence will be excluded. Although 
the inevitable discovery, independent source, and attenuation doc-
trines ultimately may allow some evidence discovered by bad-faith 
behavior to be admitted at trial, the police still have to assume at the 
time they choose to violate the Constitution that if their actions yield 
incriminating evidence, it will be excluded. Although there is a 
chance that subsequent good-faith police behavior or external events 
beyond their control422 will vitiate their conduct, they cannot rely on 
this possibility. Thus, with the pre-Hudson derivative evidence ex-
ceptions, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule remained at 
least tenuously in place. Under Hudson, the potential loss of evi-
dence is no longer a deterrent. 
E.   The End of the Suppression Hearing 
 Hudson not only creates a new exception to the exclusionary rule, 
but also fundamentally alters Fourth Amendment criminal practice. 
Under pre-Hudson law, when a defendant believed his Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated by a failure to knock and an-
nounce, his counsel would file a motion to suppress evidence result-
 
 421. Although all the hypotheticals deal with situations where the police had authority 
to conduct a search (reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop or a warrant to search a home), 
but acted in bad faith, the parallel-universe exception could also potentially be extended to 
cover situations where the police acted in good faith, thinking that they had authority to 
search when they did not. Under this theory, even a warrantless search of a home might 
not be a basis for exclusion of the evidence found during the search, so long as the police 
had probable cause for the search. Because the police had probable cause for the search, 
had they gone to a magistrate, he or she would have issued a search warrant. In the paral-
lel universe, had the police done what they should have done—sought the warrant—they 
would have been able to conduct the same search lawfully and would have found the same 
evidence. Evidence that could have been found constitutionally by hypothetical good cops 
should not be suppressed. Professor Amar believes this is the logical next step in building 
on Hudson to dismantle the exclusionary rule. See Amar, supra note 7. 
 422. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (independent voluntary con-
fession of the defendant). 
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ing from that violation. The trial court would then hold a suppression 
hearing at which the defense could attempt to establish that the 
Constitutional violation had occurred. The prosecution could put on 
evidence to rebut the claim that a violation had occurred or concede 
the violation and argue that an exception to the exclusionary rule 
applied (or argue in the alternative that a violation did not occur, but 
if it did, then an exception should apply). 
 Suppression hearings are procedural tools that serve important 
purposes beyond simply determining whether evidence shall be sup-
pressed. Suppression hearings bring police misconduct to light in a 
public forum. The hearings may alert the prosecutor’s office, the 
leadership of the police department, citizen review boards, and other 
groups to the conduct of officers who should be disciplined. Addition-
ally, it can highlight the need for additional training, either for indi-
viduals or for the entire department. Suppression hearings also es-
tablish a record that may be useful for the defendant and other vic-
tims of the constitutional violation in attempting to seek compensa-
tion or other redress for the harm they suffered. Even if evidence is 
not ultimately suppressed, motions to suppress serve to reinforce the 
need to comply with the Constitution in the minds of police officers 
by subjecting officers’ actions to scrutiny and reminding them of the 
possibility of suppression if they do not respect suspects’ rights.  
 The Hudson majority, on the other hand, seems to view suppres-
sion hearings as largely a waste of valuable judicial resources, refer-
ring to the extensive litigation occasioned by the exclusionary rule.423 
Hudson goes a long way toward solving that problem by eliminating 
the need for suppression hearings in knock-and-announce cases424 
and by providing a basis for eliminating suppression hearings for a 
variety of other types of constitutional violations in the future. By 
removing the possibility that police abuses will come to light through 
suppression hearings, Justice Scalia’s claim that knock-and-
announce violations are not a major problem in need of deterrence425 
 
 423. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006). 
 424. See, for example, United States v. Gaver, 452 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006), 
where in response to a motion to suppress filed prior to Hudson, the Eighth Circuit stated 
(citing Hudson), “We need not consider whether the officers acted reasonably by entering 
without knocking and announcing, because even if there were a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule would be inapplicable.” Id.; see also United States v. 
Robinson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (D. Minn. 2006) (summarily denying motion to sup-
press based on alleged knock-and-announce violation); In re Frank S., 142 Cal. App. 4th 
145, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“Defendant Frank S. contends that his counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to move to suppress evidence discovered incident to his arrest. He argues 
that the arresting officer’s violation of the knock-and-announce rule requires exclusion of 
the evidence. The claim fails because the United [States] Supreme Court recently held in 
Hudson v. Michigan that violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not justify applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule.”). 
 425. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68. 
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can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Police violations may appear to 
be on the decline simply because there will be few reported cases of 
such violations.  
 One potentially hopeful note for those who believe Hudson was 
wrongly decided is Justice Kennedy’s apparent willingness to recon-
sider his position if the decision results in increased police abuses as 
the dissenting Justices fear:  
 Today’s decision does not address any demonstrated pattern of 
knock-and-announce violations. If a widespread pattern of viola-
tions were shown, and particularly if those violations were com-
mitted against persons who lacked the means or voice to mount an 
effective protest, there would be reason for grave concern. Even 
then, however, the Court would have to acknowledge that extend-
ing the remedy of exclusion to all the evidence seized following a 
knock-and-announce violation would mean revising the require-
ment of causation that limits our discretion in applying the exclu-
sionary rule. That type of extension also would have significant 
practical implications, adding to the list of issues requiring resolu-
tion at the criminal trial questions such as whether police officers 
entered a home after waiting 10 seconds or 20.426
Yet, however sincere Justice Kennedy may be, the likelihood of being 
able to demonstrate such a widespread pattern without criminal de-
fense counsel bringing violations to the notice of the courts and the 
public through suppression motions is remote.  
F.   The Fruitless Poisonous Tree Doctrine 
 Just as Terry v. Ohio revolutionized Fourth Amendment analysis 
by creating a new intermediate class of Fourth Amendment searches 
and seizures subject to a lower standard than traditional “full-blown 
searches,” Hudson effectively creates a new category of Fourth 
Amendment violations subject to a similar lower standard. This cate-
gory, starting with knock-and-announce violations, includes those 
Fourth Amendment violations that, by their nature, do not merit the 
exclusionary rule because they do not, by definition, yield poisonous 
fruit. Filing a motion to suppress would be pointless in such cases be-
cause even if a constitutional violation could be established, there 
would be no evidence subject to suppression.427 This category of con-
stitutional violations may be labeled fruitless poisonous trees: there is 
a poisonous tree—a constitutional violation—but it is barren.  
 
 426. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 427. Indeed, after Hudson, it could be argued that filing a suppression motion for a 
knock-and-announce violation would be unethical, since there is no “good faith basis in law 
or fact” for such a motion. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006) (Meritorious Claim and Contentions). 
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 Terry v. Ohio created an intermediate class of Fourth Amendment 
searches and seizures: those requiring reasonable suspicion instead 
of probable cause.428 Terry stop-and-frisks were just the first category 
of searches and seizures to be placed in this classification. Later, ad-
ditional categories of searches were added: limited weapon searches 
of cars,429 protective sweeps for confederates in homes,430 immigra-
tion stops,431 vehicle stops to check license and registration,432 tempo-
rary seizures of property,433 and searches of probationers and their 
homes.434 As discussed below, Richards v. Wisconsin incorporated the 
reasonable suspicion standard into the knock-and-announce arena, 
allowing the police to dispense with the requirement if they have 
reasonable suspicion of certain dangers.435 The justification for the 
less stringent standard adopted in Terry is the minimally intrusive 
nature of the searches and seizures involved relative to full-scale 
searches and seizures of persons and protected places.436 Thus, the 
minimally intrusive nature of a Terry stop was balanced against the 
need for police protection, public safety, and effective law enforce-
ment and was found to be reasonable.437  
G.   Criteria for Fruitless Poisonous Trees 
 What is the basis for establishing a second tier of Fourth Amend-
ment violations? What type of violations will fall into the fruitless 
poisonous tree category in addition to knock-and-announce viola-
tions? Hudson provides several clues for the criteria to be applied. 
One possibility is that placement in the class will require a balancing 
of social costs versus deterrence value such as that conducted by Jus-
tice Scalia in Hudson.438 Thus, any type of Fourth Amendment viola-
tion that a majority of the Court found unlikely to be deterred by the 
exclusionary rule or which they determined there was little incentive 
to commit could be considered a fruitless poisonous tree. The problem 
with this criterion is that the social costs of the exclusionary rule will 
always be high and the (theoretical) potential deterrence of internal 
discipline or a civil suit will always be present. The social costs bal-
 
 428. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 429. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 430. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 431. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 432. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 433. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 434. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (searching of probationers and their 
homes is appropriate when supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized as a condi-
tion of probation).  
 435. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
 436. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). 
 437. Id. at 27.  
 438. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165-68 (2006) 
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ancing analysis is really illusory. In truth, it is an argument to aban-
don the exclusionary rule altogether.  
 Another possibility implied by Hudson is that certain de minimis 
violations should be considered fruitless poisonous trees because the 
exclusionary remedy would be disproportionate. This argument was 
specifically advanced by the government439 and was one of the argu-
ments relied upon by a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit in refus-
ing to apply the exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce violation 
in United States v. Espinoza.440  Justice Scalia did not explicitly en-
dorse this argument, but used language which implies that the logic 
appeals to him. For example, he repeatedly refers to the exclusionary 
rule as the “massive remedy”441 and also called it the “incongruent 
remedy.”442 Incongruent is simply a synonym for disproportionate. 
Justice Scalia further highlighted his view of the disproportionality 
between violation and remedy by minimizing the significance of the 
violation, calling it a “misstep,”443 and exaggerating the severity of 
Hudson’s offense, dubiously claiming that “[l]arge quantities of drugs 
were found.”444 A major potential problem with exempting certain de 
minimis violations is that as soon as a court has determined that a 
constitutional violation is sufficiently minor as to be exempt from the 
exclusionary rule, the police will immediately feel no need to comply 
with that minor aspect of the Constitution. 
H.   Fruitless Poisonous Trees and Causation 
 Fourth Amendment violations that do not give the officers an evi-
dentiary advantage or cause them to find evidence could also be con-
sidered fruitless poisonous trees. The dicta in Ramirez regarding a 
sufficient causal relationship445 has apparently been elevated to a 
constitutional causation requirement, with five members of the Court 
endorsing Justice Scalia’s view of “the requirement of unattenuated 
causation.”446 Justice Kennedy specifically relied on the Ramirez 
footnote in his concurrence: 
 
 439. Id. at 2181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The United States, in its brief and at oral ar-
gument, has argued that suppression is ‘an especially harsh remedy given the nature of 
the violation in this case.’ ”) (citation omitted).  
 440. 256 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The [e]xclusion of [e]vidence is a 
[d]isproportionately [s]evere [s]anction in [c]ases [w]here the [p]olice [c]onduct [d]oes [n]ot 
[a]ctually [h]arm [p]rotected [i]nterests.”). The Seventh Circuit’s approach was criticized in 
a vigorous dissent by Judge Wood and by the editors of the Harvard Law Review. Id. at 
729 (Wood, J., dissenting); Recent Cases, supra note 87. 
 441. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 442. Id. at 2166. 
 443. Id. at 2164. 
 444. Id. at 2162. 
 445. 523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998). 
 446. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. 
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Under our precedents the causal link between a violation of the 
knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenu-
ated to allow suppression. Cf. United States v. Ramirez (applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a “suffi-
cient causal relationship” between the unlawful conduct and the 
discovery of evidence). When, for example, a violation results from 
want of a 20-second pause but an ensuing, lawful search lasting 
five hours discloses evidence of criminality, the failure to wait at 
the door cannot properly be described as having caused the discov-
ery of evidence. 
 . . . . 
 In this case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of 
a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent 
search pursuant to a lawful warrant.447
 Indeed, according to Justice Kennedy, “extending the remedy of 
exclusion to all the evidence seized following a knock-and-announce 
violation would mean revising the requirement of causation that lim-
its our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule.”448  
 Although the Court has required some logical nexus between a 
constitutional violation and the evidence sought to be suppressed, 
the imposition of a rigid requirement that the constitutional violation 
cause the police to acquire the evidence in order for the defendant to 
qualify for the exclusionary rule is new, troubling, and inconsistent 
with the way the Court has applied exclusionary rules in other con-
texts. For example, if the police fail to provide Miranda449 warnings 
to a suspect, incriminating statements made by the suspect are in-
admissible. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court rejected a volun-
tariness test which would have admitted unwarned statements if 
they were voluntarily made and therefore, at least arguably, not 
caused by the lack of rights advisement.450 The prosecution is not of-
fered the opportunity to attempt to prove that the suspect would have 
made the statements even if he had been given Miranda warnings. 
 Similarly, under the Sixth Amendment, an indicted defendant has 
the constitutional right to counsel during lineups and other corporeal 
identification procedures.451 If counsel is not present at such a lineup, 
evidence of the out-of-court identification is inadmissible at trial.452 
Did this constitutional violation cause the eyewitness to identify the 
suspect? Would the eyewitness have identified the defendant anyway 
if counsel had been there? It does not matter, because there is no 
 
 447. Id. at 2170-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72 n.3). 
 448. Id. at 2171. 
 449. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 450. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 451. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). 
 452. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967). 
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causation requirement. Even if the prosecutor could prove that the 
lineup was conducted in a perfectly nonsuggestive manner and the 
eyewitness undoubtedly would have made the identification even 
with counsel present, the identification will be excluded.  
 The Court has specifically rejected causation analysis where it 
could potentially benefit defendants. In Oregon v. Elstad, the suspect 
was questioned while in police custody without Miranda warnings 
and made an incriminating statement.453 Later, at the police station, 
he was given Miranda warnings.454 He then gave a second, more 
damaging statement.455 The first statement was clearly inadmissi-
ble.456 Elstad argued that this second statement should also be inad-
missible because the initial constitutional violation was the fruit of 
the earlier statement.457 He argued that he had already let the “cat 
out of the bag” and therefore, not realizing that the first statement 
would be suppressed, saw no point in remaining silent.458 In this 
sense, the constitutional violation (the initial failure to warn) caused 
the police to obtain the second confession. According to Elstad, but 
for the police’s initial failure to advise him of his rights, he would not 
have confessed either time.459 The Court rejected this argument.460
 Requiring proof of direct causation before evidence will be ex-
cluded could potentially lead to serious abuses by police. Property de-
struction and physical abuse of suspects are examples of Fourth 
Amendment violations that typically do not cause evidence to be 
found. As discussed earlier, “[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of 
property in the course of a search”461 could encompass a wide range 
of activities. The destruction could take place prior to or as part of 
the entry or once inside during the search. For example, the police 
could break an expensive stained glass window, rather than simply 
lifting up an open window or knocking out a less expensive plate 
glass window, or they could destroy a heavy and expensive front door 
and frame, when they could just as easily break through an inexpen-
sive side door. This unnecessary destruction would not be a knock-
and-announce violation, assuming the police announced their pres-
ence and waited an appropriate time before entering. It would be un-
reasonable, though, and thus violate the Fourth Amendment, if there 
were no good reason to cause such extensive or expensive damage. 
The police could also cause unnecessary damage after a lawful entry 
 
 453. 470 U.S. 298, 301 (1985). 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id. at 301-02. 
 456. Id. at 302. 
 457. Id. at 305. 
 458. Id. at 302. 
 459. Id.  
 460. Id. at 300. 
 461. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).  
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by ransacking the interior (breaking furniture, slashing mattresses, 
ripping up carpet, tossing clothes and papers around, and leaving 
piles of debris with no thought for the potential clean up and reor-
ganization problems) while ostensibly searching through the home. 
The property destruction would not be causally related to the finding 
of evidence, because the police would have found the incriminating 
evidence if they had conducted the search carefully minimizing prop-
erty damage. Similarly, the police could rough up the occupants of a 
home during a search. Although clearly unreasonable, such behavior 
would not likely lead the police to additional evidence that they 
would not find by diligently searching. Thus, the poisonous tree—the 
constitutional violation—would not bear fruit. 
I.   Media Presence During a Search: The First Fruitless Poisonous 
Tree? 
 There is another type of Fourth Amendment violation that the 
Court has previously suggested fits in the fruitless poisonous tree 
category, albeit one likely to be rare. In Wilson v. Layne, the Court 
held that “it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to 
bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during 
the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in 
the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”462 Because 
Wilson was a civil damages suit,463 the Court did not need to consider 
whether the exclusionary rule should apply.464 Nevertheless, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist added, in an accompanying footnote: 
 Even though such actions might violate the Fourth Amendment, 
if the police are lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is the presence of the media and not the presence of 
the police in the home. We have no occasion here to decide whether 
the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or 
developed by the media representatives.465
 It is surprising that Justice Scalia did not discuss Wilson in Hud-
son, because it was cited in the briefs and arguably offers the strong-
est support of any precedent for his decision. Wilson debatably 
stands for the proposition that even when the police act unreasona-
bly in some aspect of the manner of their execution of the search (in 
this case, by allowing a media representative to accompany them, an 
unnecessary invasion of the occupant’s privacy comparable to a 
knock-and-announce violation) and thereby violate the Fourth 
Amendment, exclusion does not necessarily follow. Wilson also lends 
 
 462. 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). 
 463. Id. at 608. 
 464. Id. at 614 n.2. 
 465. Id. 
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support to the theory that a violation in the manner in which a 
search is conducted can be separated from the lawfulness of the 
search itself. Although the police violated the Constitution, Wilson 
suggests that any evidence the police found would still be admissible. 
Indeed, this is exactly how lower courts have interpreted Wilson. For 
example, in Artis v. United States, the appellant claimed ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to file a mo-
tion to suppress on the basis that the police had allowed a television 
news crew to accompany them during the execution of the search 
warrant.466 Citing Wilson, the court rejected this argument, stating 
that the exclusionary rule would not have applied anyway, so there 
was no justification for defense counsel to file a suppression mo-
tion.467 Similarly, in United States v. Hendrixson, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that evidence would not be subject to exclusion where 
unlawful media presence did not expand the scope of a police search 
beyond that allowed by the terms of the warrant or otherwise facili-
tate the search, again citing the footnote in Wilson.468  
J.   Multiple Fourth Amendment Violations 
 One issue not addressed in Hudson is what happens when there 
are multiple Fourth Amendment violations during the same search. 
Suppose the police learn of a possible child pornography collector. 
The individual has no prior criminal record and lives alone, and 
there is no basis to believe he owns a weapon. His collection is al-
leged to include magazines and numerous files on his computer’s 
hard drive, with backup copies on CDs. The collector is also alleged 
to have tried to lure some young children into his home to be photo-
graphed. The police apply for and receive a warrant to search the 
suspect’s home for child pornography. There is no basis for either a 
nighttime or a no-knock warrant. The police do not expect any dan-
ger to themselves, nor do they anticipate efforts to destroy evidence. 
But the officers involved despise pedophiles and decide to teach the 
suspect a lesson. Rather than wait for daylight, they execute the 
warrant in the middle of the night. They break down the front door 
 
 466. 802 A.2d 959, 964 (D.C. 2002). 
 467. Id. at 967-68. 
 468. 234 F.3d 494, 496-97 (11th Cir. 2000). An interesting twist in Wilson is the sug-
gestion that evidence found by the media representative during the search might be sub-
ject to the exclusionary rule. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614, n.2. Thus if the police actually al-
lowed the media to assist in the search, as opposed to merely observe the search, then the 
evidence unearthed by the media might be suppressed. It seems to me, especially in light 
of Hudson, that if actually confronted with this situation, the Court would decline to sup-
press the evidence, citing the inevitable discovery exception. That is, if the police were al-
ready in the home executing an otherwise valid search warrant, and they had not allowed 
the media representative to participate in the search, they eventually would have found 
whatever the media representative found on his/her own.  
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with a battering ram, rough up the suspect, and trash his entire 
house, trampling on his belongings with muddy feet, crumpling up 
his magazines and papers, and knocking over lamps and other 
breakable objects. During this search, they find incriminating evi-
dence. The police have violated the Constitution in several ways: un-
reasonably destroying property, both upon entry and during the 
search; unreasonably executing the warrant at night; blatantly dis-
regarding knock-and-announce; and physically abusing a suspect. 
Clearly, this is an “unreasonable search and seizure.”469 But should 
the evidence be suppressed? Under the logic of Hudson, there is a 
strong possibility that it would not be. Both individually and collec-
tively, none of these violations can be said to have “caused” the police 
to find the evidence or given them an evidentiary advantage. Had the 
police simply executed the search warrant in a reasonable, good-faith 
manner, they would have found exactly the same evidence.  
 Lest the hypothetical be considered too far-fetched, consider 
United States v. Larabee.470 In Larabee, the Sheriff’s Department re-
ceived a warrant to search an apartment at approximately 5:00 
p.m.471 The search warrant was executed at approximately 11:10 p.m. 
by four deputy sheriffs, although they had no good reason to execute 
the search at night.472 When the officers executed the search war-
rant, they banged on the door and the side of the apartment with 
their fists while simultaneously shouting “Sheriff’s Office—search 
warrant” three times.473 Although they had no specific reason to fear 
for their safety or that evidence would be destroyed, they did not 
pause and wait for a reply.474 They immediately pried open the storm 
door of the apartment and kicked open the front door, damaging the 
storm door and the door jamb in the process.475 A motion to suppress 
was filed and granted.476 The district court’s conclusion: 
 The search warrant was executed in contravention of the Fourth 
Amendment because there was an inadequate justification for exe-
cuting the warrant at night and because the officers did not wait a 
reasonable time to determine whether their request to enter the 
apartment was refused before forcibly opening the doors. In addi-
tion, the officers damaged the entry to the apartment when they exe-
 
 469. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 470. No. 05-40070-01-RDR, 2006 WL 839451 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2006); see also United 
States v. Nielson, No. 04-40068-01-RDR, 2004 WL 3186011 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2004), aff’d, 
415 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 471. Larabee, 2006 WL 839451, at *1. 
 472. Id. at *1, *4. 
 473. Id. at *2. 
 474. Id. at *4. 
 475. Id. at *2. 
 476. Id. at *5. 
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cuted the warrant. All of these factors lead the court to conclude that 
this was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.477
 Larabee was announced three months prior to Hudson.478 After 
Hudson, it is unlikely that the three factors that rendered the search 
unreasonable would be sufficient to warrant suppression.479 But can 
it be that the police can repeatedly and deliberately violate a defen-
dant’s rights without triggering the exclusionary rule? One possible 
argument in favor of suppression in cases like Larabee is that the 
multiple violations would take this case out of the de minimis viola-
tion category so that suppression would no longer be “incongru-
ent.”480 Whether or not the cumulative unreasonableness of multiple 
violations of the Fourth Amendment should be enough to warrant 
suppression remains an open question that the Supreme Court will 
ultimately have to address. One could argue that two or more Fourth 
Amendment violations, which individually fall into the fruitless poi-
sonous tree category, should bear poisonous fruit when they are com-
bined. This approach would afford one potential way to limit the 
scope of Hudson, but such an approach could lead to anomalous and 
unfair results. Why should suppression be unavailable for a single 
but egregious knock-and-announce violation, yet available for two 
less serious Fourth Amendment violations? The basic problem with 
Hudson is that it has begun the process of ranking Fourth Amend-
ment violations in the first place, thereby weakening the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”481 Going further down 
this road will not undo the damage to the Fourth Amendment 
wrought by Hudson.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 By creating a new exception to the exclusionary rule as well as a 
second-class category of Fourth Amendment violations that are 
automatically excluded from the coverage of the exclusionary rule, 
the Court has not only failed to deter violations and encourage com-
pliance with the Fourth Amendment by the police, but has affirma-
tively encouraged lawless behavior by officers and departments who 
will no longer be restrained by fear of losing criminal prosecutions. 
The sad reality of Hudson is that police can now intentionally choose 
to violate the Constitution, knowing that it may have no effect on any 
subsequent prosecution. Despite Justice Kennedy’s assurances that 
 
 477. Id.  
 478. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (decided June 15, 2006); Larabee, 
2006 WL 839451, at *1 (decided Mar. 28, 2006);  
 479. Larabee, 2006 WL 839451, at *5. 
 480. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
 481. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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the decision is narrowly confined to “the specific context of the knock-
and-announce requirement,”482 it is unlikely that the current Court 
majority will limit Hudson to its facts and not follow it to its logical 
conclusion, especially considering the recent trend of the Court 
minimizing the risk of police abuses while narrowing the reach of the 
exclusionary rule.483
 The real danger of Hudson is not merely that it “destroys the 
strongest legal incentive to comply with the Constitution’s knock-
and-announce requirement” and that “it weakens, perhaps destroys, 
much of the practical value of the Constitution’s knock-and-announce 
protection,”484 but that, by severely undermining the exclusionary 
rule, it may weaken—and perhaps destroy—the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment. Hudson has given a green light to a potentially 
wide range of intentional unreasonable police conduct. It is unfortu-
nate that such a momentous and troubling decision is built on such a 
shaky logical foundation. Perhaps in Justice Scalia’s parallel uni-
verse, where all the police departments are models of professionalism 
and restraint, the exclusionary rule would not be needed to deter of-
ficial misconduct. But in the real world of twenty-first-century Amer-
ica, the full protection of the exclusionary rule is still needed if the 
Fourth Amendment is to be more than an empty promise.  
 
 
 482. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 483. See, e.g., Part IV.A. 
 484. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
